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ABSTRACT 
Information Operation Condition (INFOCON) implementations and specifically 
the impact these implementations can have on warfighting command and control 
processes are not yet widely understood or appreciated by the majority of the operating 
forces. INFOCON actions are designed to heighten or reduce defensive posture 
uniformly, to defend against computer network attacks, and to mitigate sustained damage 
to the DoD infrastructure. Experimentation is required to explore the effects on certain 
command and control processes under various INFOCON conditions. This thesis 
explored requirements for conducting these INFOCON experiments and resulted in the 
development of an INFOCON experimental design methodology that can be used as a 
framework for designing and conducting INFOCON experiments in the field. INFOCON 
experimentation will provide insights and a better understanding of the effects that these 
implementations will have on the ability of a commander to command and control his or 
her forces. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the last two years we have seen a series of intrusions into numerous 
Department of Defense computer networks as well as networks of other 
federal agencies, universities, and private sector entities. Intruders have 
successfully accessed U.S. Government networks and taken enormous 
amounts of unclassified but sensitive information. (Louis J. Freeh, 
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 16 February 2000) 
A.   BACKGROUND 
Unauthorized access to Department of Defense (DoD) computer networks and 
systems poses a real and current potential threat to our national security. From the 
acquisition of information to the disruption of activities during critical operational 
periods, computer system and network intrusion and attack represent significant 
derivative vulnerabilities of the DoD's reliance on information systems and information 
technology in the conduct of daily business. Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, stated: 
One of the greatest potential threats to our national security is the prospect 
of 'information warfare' by foreign militaries against our critical 
infrastructures. Foreign nations are developing information warfare 
programs because they cannot defeat the United States in a head-to-head 
military encounter and they believe that information operations are a way 
to strike at America's Achilles Heel - our reliance on information 
technology (Freeh, 2000) 
The government's increased worldwide dependence on information technologies 
and the vulnerabilities associated with this dependence for military operations demands 
protection, detection, restoration, and an integrated response to protect and defend 
friendly information and systems from attack. 
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum, CM-510-99, dated 10 
March 1999, established the Information Operations Condition (INFOCON) system for 
DoD. The intent of the INFOCON system is to provide all DoD elements with a 
structured, standardized approach to defend against and react to attacks on computer 
systems and networks. Initially, the Director for Operations, Joint Staff (J3) was 
responsible for administering the INFOCON system. This transitioned to the 
Commander of the Joint Task Force for Computer Network Defense (JTF-CND) as this 
new task force reached initial operational capability. On 1 October 1999, Commander in 
Chief, U.S. Space Command assumed responsibility for computer network defense 
including command authority over JTF-CND. 
INFOCON actions are designed to heighten or reduce defensive posture 
uniformly, to defend against computer network attacks (CNA), and to mitigate sustained 
damage to DoD infrastructure. There are currently five INFOCON levels that reflect 
defensive postures based on the risk or existance of computer network attacks. The 
following provides a general characterization of each INFOCON level: 
NORMAL - There is no significant activity indicating an increased risk of attack 
ALPHA - There is an increased risk of attack 
BRAVO - There is a specific risk of attack 
CHARLIE - A limited information system attack has been detected 
DELTA - Information systems are under attack 
The dynamics of INFOCON implementations, and specifically their impact on the 
ability of warfighters to execute command and control functions effectively, are not yet 
widely understood and/or appreciated by the majority of the operating forces. Naval 
staffs at the Numbered Fleet level and above have been working coordination and 
implementation issues associated with INFOCON's since well before CM-510-99 
articulated the current INFOCON policy, and INFOCON actions are now being 
incorporated in Fleet training exercises. However, specific policy and actions to make 
INFOCON implementation an effective tool in protecting the vital information 
infrastructure of the DoD are still under development. The concepts, responsive 
measures, and impact of responsive measures are still exploratory and require focused 
experimentation efforts to gain further understanding. Because military command and 
control networks are truly global in nature, actions taken at one location in response to 
operational and intelligence assessments resulting in INFOCON decisions have far 
reaching and at times not fully understood effects in a network centric environment. 
The critical role of global networks to support naval operations makes the 
development of effective infrastructure protection of the utmost importance to naval 
forces. The INFOCON system provides all DoD elements with a structured, standardized 
approach to defend against and react to attacks on computer systems and networks. 
INFOCON actions should be reviewed and tested often. This will help personnel 
understand their roles and responsibilities, determine the effect of responsive measures on 
mission effectiveness, and detect problems in existing procedures. As an initial step to 
understanding INFOCON concepts,  a controlled experiment,  in which the author 
participated, was conducted at the SPA WAR Information Operations Center of the Future 
(IOCOF) laboratory in May, 2000 with a COMTHIRDFLT Battle Watch Staff. This 
effort identified important baseline information relating to situational awareness (SA) and 
command and control effectiveness. Although much was learned from this early effort, 
the test environment was artificial. Therefore, subsequent experimentation in an 
operational environment is needed to better understand the impacts that setting 
INFOCON's will have on "real world" mission tasking. Specifically, INFOCON 
experimentation in an operational environment should be conducted to better understand 
the impact of INFOCON implementations on the command and control process. 
B.        PURPOSE 
As mentioned above, Information Operation Condition (INFOCON) 
implementations and specifically the impact these implementations can have on 
warfighting command and control processes are not yet widely understood or appreciated 
by the majority of the operating forces. Experimentation is required to explore the effects 
of imposing INFOCON on command and control functions in an operational environment 
under various scenarios. This thesis will explore requirements for conducting these 
INFOCON experiments and will result in the development of an INFOCON experimental 
design methodology that can be used as a baseline for conducting operational INFOCON 
experiments. 
C.        RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
A primary hypothesis associated with INFOCON implementation is that the 
increasingly restrictive posture associated with progressive INFOCON levels will have a 
correspondingly adverse impact the warfighters' ability to accomplish command and 
control tasks in a network centric environment. In order to obtain data to examine this 
hypothesis, experimentation aimed at researching the effects on certain command and 
control processes under various INFOCON conditions is required. INFOCON 
experimentation efforts will provide insight and a better understanding of the effects that 
these implementations have on the ability of a commander to conduct seamless command 
and control functions after such conditions are instituted. This thesis will result in the 
development of an experiment design framework that one can use for evaluating the 
effects of imposing INFOCON on operational command and control functions. The 
primary questions to be researched in this thesis include: 
• How can the effects of INFOCON be evaluated in an operational environment? 
• What is the baseline INFOCON experimental design for measuring the impact of 
INFOCON implementations on an operational command and control architecture? 
D. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
This thesis is divided into six chapters including the introduction. Chapter II, C4I 
Systems Security in a Network Centric Environment: An Overview, provides a synopsis 
of the Network Centric Warfare concept and discusses the requirements and challenges of 
maintaining information dominance in a Network Centric Warfare environment.     In 
addition, this chapter also provides a broad overview of issues related to computer 
network vulnerabilities and includes a discussion of the difficulties associated with 
protecting military networks from an adversarial attack.     Chapter III, Information 
Operation Condition (INFOCON) System, is intended to provide the reader with a 
thorough understanding of the INFOCON concept.    It also highlights several recent 
INFOCON exercise and experimentation efforts and documents key lessons learned from 
those efforts.    Chapter IV, Information Assurance (IA) Command and Control (C2) 
INFOCON Lab Experiment, provides a detailed description of the IA C2 experiment, in 
which the author participated.    It includes sub-sections describing the experimental 
design, data collection methodology, data analysis approach, and lessons learned. These 
sub-sections will be used as a guide from which a framework for conducting an 
experiment in an operational environment will be based.   Chapter V, INFOCON Field 
Experimentation Methodology, will provide experiment planners with the methodology 
and tools necessary for planning and conducting an INFOCON experiment that focuses 
on the impact to command and control processes in the midst of varying INFOCON 
levels.    This section will detail how an operational INFOCON experiment can be 
conducted and will provide the framework to shape an experiment for    various 
operational scenarios.    Rather than design a rigid experiment focused on a specific 
command and control architecture, this approach provides the essential focus areas that 
planners must consider prior to planning and conducting an INFOCON experiment. 
II. C4I SYSTEMS SECURITY IN A NETWORK CENTRIC ENVIRONMENT: 
AN OVERVIEW 
A.        THE SHIFT TOWARDS NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE 
Information and knowledge have always been crucial in warfighting, but 
operational and organizational innovation, supported by emerging technology, now has 
the potential to produce orders of magnitude improvements in our ability to build superior 
knowledge and then exploit this superiority for decisive success. The Navy Capstone 
Concept articulates how the Navy will shift from attrition-based, platform centric 
operations to effects-based, network centric operations. This concept known as Network 
Centric Warfare (NCW) says that as we fight a brown water (littoral) battle, we need to 
connect our ships, weapons systems, information systems and intelligence systems in a 
network centric manner, much like we use the Internet to connect a variety of users to a 
common backbone. NCW leverages knowledge and information to operate inside 
potential adversaries' sensor and engagement timelines and to create a disproportionate 
impact on potential adversaries in presence, crisis and war. 
1. Information Superiority 
Throughout history, successful military operations and warfare have depended 
upon timely and accurate information. In the age of digital electronics, our forces rely 
upon computers and telecommunications as essential information components of all types 
of defense systems and functions.   These information capabilities are vital to achieving 
Information Superiority - the key to our Joint Vision 2010 (JV2010) goal of Full 
Spectrum Dominance. JV2010 provides a conceptual template established to improve the 
conduct of joint warfighting operations by leveraging technological advances. JV2010 
introduced the emerging operational concepts of Dominant Maneuver, Precision 
Engagement, Focused Logistics, and Full-Dimensional Protection. The key enabler for 
all four of these operational concepts is Information Superiority based on the ongoing 
revolution in technological development. Without Information Superiority, JV2010's 
concepts become little more than the current operational concepts of maneuver, strike, 
protection, and logistics. In short, without Information Superiority, the U.S. military will 
lose its edge and find itself fighting the protracted wars of attrition JV2010 was designed 
to preclude. 
Joint Vision 2010 also stresses the importance of Information Superiority as the 
basis for improved command, control, and intelligence functions. Information Superiority 
is defined in Joint Publication 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, as "the 
capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while 
exploiting or denying and adversary's ability to do the same." (Joint Pub 3-13, 1998) 
Thus, by definition, Information Superiority has both defensive and offensive 
implications. In order to achieve an uninterrupted flow of information, the systems and 
processes that enable that flow must be defended against adversarial actions. Although 
degrading an adversary's information flow is important, defending one's own is even 
more critical to successful military operations. 
2.        Potential Impact of C4I on Military Operations 
To exercise authority and direction effectively in combat and other military 
operations, commanders must have situational awareness. Understanding the battlespace 
is essential to the command and control of the forces. The cornerstone of information 
superiority is advanced C4I technology and systems, which can provide to all tactical 
levels of command a robust, continuous, common operating picture of the battlespace. 
The resulting heightened situational awareness should vastly improve the effectiveness 
with which commanders at all levels can pursue a mission. 
However, DoD is in an increasingly compromised position. The rate at which 
information systems are being relied on outstrips the rate at which they are being 
protected. Also, the time needed to develop and deploy effective defenses in cyberspace 
is much longer than the time required to develop and mount a cyberspace attack. 
According to the National Research Council (NRC) study, Realizing the Potential of C4I: 
Fundamental Challenges, "The result is vulnerability: a gap between exposure and 
defense on the one hand and attack on the other. This gap is growing wider over time, 
and it leaves DoD a likely target for disruption or pin-down via information attack." 
(NRC, 1999) Hence, the more military leverage that C4I systems provide for U.S. forces, 
the larger the incentives are for an opponent to attack those systems. 
3. Information Operations/Information Assurance 
The process of attacking and defending information is Information Operations 
(10), defined in DoD Directive 3600.1, Information Operations, as "action taken to affect 
adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information 
and information systems." (DoD 3600.1, 1998) This definition communicates that there 
is more to 10 than simply attacking computer systems. 10 consists of technology, 
processes, and human factors impacting the mind of the decision-maker. 10 can be 
targeted against leaders or key decision-makers, but can also affect every echelon of the 
military, government, and even the general population. 
According to Joint Publication 3-13, Defensive Information Operations "ensure 
timely, accurate, and relevant information access while denying adversaries the 
opportunity to exploit friendly information and information systems for their own 
purposes." (Joint Pub 3-13, 1998) Defensive 10 are conducted through Information 
Assurance (IA), Operational Security (OPSEC), physical security, counter deception, 
counter psychological operations, counter intelligence, and electronic warfare. Although 
each of these actions is important, Information Assurance is the most critical to the 
success of the operational concepts described in JV2010 because it ensures that friendly 
systems will provide the information as required and that friendly systems are protected 
or isolated from potential adversarial attack. Information Assurance (IA) is defined in 
Joint Publication 3-13 as: 
Information Operations that protect and defend information systems by 
ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and 
non-repudiation. This includes providing for restoration of information 
systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities. 
(Joint Pub 3-13, 1998) 
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4.        Information Assurance Operations 
Information Assurance (IA) actions are 10 that incorporates detection, protection, 
and reaction capabilities to protect and defend information and information systems by 
ensuring the security services of: availability, integrity, identification and authentication, 
confidentiality, and non-repudiation. The Information Operation Condition (INFOCON) 
system is a proactive IA initiative that recommends actions to uniformly heighten or 
reduce defensive posture, to defend against computer network attacks, and to mitigate 
sustained damage to the DoD information infrastructure, including computer and 
telecommunications networks and systems. Details of the INFOCON system are 
discussed in Chapter III. 
IA policy drives IA operations by establishing goals, courses of action, and 
standards. IA policy formally states the security requirements for information systems, 
what must be protected, how resources are used, and what must be done or not done 
during situational threat scenarios. Standard operating procedures (SOP) should define 
system configuration, deployment, routine operations, and incident response and 
reporting details. 
As an example, after an intrusion is detected, incident information must be 
reported through established channels to appropriate authorities and specialized analysis 
and response centers. Incident response begins with immediate local emergency damage- 
limitation and survivability actions that should be stated in the SOP and implemented 
promptly.  As mentioned in Information Assurance Through Defense in Depth, a paper 
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prepared for the Joint Staff by Lt Col B. Ashley, USAF, "Careful, effective and timely 
decisions must be made concerning appropriate additional responses, such as: declare a 
higher level security situation or information condition (INFOCON), isolate affected 
systems, or pursue legal, diplomatic, economic, or military actions." (Ashley, 1999) 
B.        SECURITY IMPLICATIONS FOR NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE 
DoD's increasing reliance on information technology in military operations 
increases the value (to an adversary) of DoD's information infrastructure and information 
systems as a military target. Thus, if the United States is to realize the benefits of 
increased use of C4I in the face of a clever and determined opponent, it must secure its 
C4I systems against attack. Traditionally, the military has ensured the security of its 
information systems by a risk avoidance strategy. That is, keeping its network 
infrastructure separate from the public Internet, and strictly limiting access to it via locked 
spaces, security clearances, and cryptographic devices. However, the drive to attain 
Network Centric Warfare capability has profound implications for security and requires a 
shift in the protection strategy. In a June 1999 address to the Senate Governmental 
Affairs Committee, Lt General Kenneth A. Minihan, then Director National Security 
Agency, stated: 
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We face increasing risks to U.S. interests in cyberspace. U.S. dependence 
on, and worldwide connectivity through this relatively new medium 
increase our exposure to traditional adversaries and a growing body of new 
ones, many of whom are fast developing their capabilities to exploit and 
disrupt networked information systems. The ability of adversary groups 
and nation states to disrupt or influence U.S. civil and military activities 
through manipulation of our information networks, without having to 
confront directly traditional U.S. military power, will become an 
increasingly attractive option for them as we move through the 21st 
century. (Minihan, 1999) 
1.        Information Security Organizational Culture 
The National Research Council (NRC) study, Realizing the Potential of C4I: 
Fundamental Challenges, emphasizes, "A culture of information security is required 
throughout the organization. The culture of any organization determines how seriously 
its members take their security responsibilities. For information security, policies and 
practices are at least as important as technical mechanisms." (NRC, 1999) The study 
also indicates that senior leadership must take the lead to promote information assurance 
as an important cultural value. Top-level commitment is not sufficient to ensure good 
security practices. Without it, however, the organization will not focus on security but 
will expend its energy on other things that seem more directly related to its core mission. 
2. Network Centric Warfare is Technology Based 
The Naval Operations In the Information Age - A Capstone Concept for Network 
Centric Operations paper clearly identifies and discusses the value of Network Centric 
Warfare enabled by the achievement of Information Superiority. The Navy's IT-21 
initiative was designed and implemented to achieve this Information Superiority in a time 
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of limited resources and rapidly changing technology by requiring that the military 
capitalize on available commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) technology as much as possible. 
However, the combination of open standards, COTS technology, full connectivity, and 
information service regionalization has compelled the military to develop a new 
protection strategy based not on risk avoidance, but rather on risk management. We now 
embrace common technologies, recognizing that some of these technologies come with 
well-documented vulnerabilities. Further, as more and more systems are interconnected, 
the user population increases significantly. The sharing of a common infrastructure 
which connects with the public Internet brings with it a world-wide host of hackers, 
criminals and foreign agents who are practiced and capable of surfing their way through 
that infrastructure. 
3. Network Centric Warfare is Information Intensive 
Traditionally, security has focused on ensuring confidentiality; the non-disclosure 
of classified information to those who are not authorized to see it. While this remains an 
important consideration, the shift to Network Centric Warfare, with its goal of speed of 
command, is heavily reliant on both the accuracy and timeliness of information, and on 
the continued availability of critical communication channels. A military maneuver is not 
likely to succeed if its participants cannot communicate, or if their decisions and actions 
are based on inaccurate, false, or outdated information. Many of the best known and 
most common attacks that occur on the Internet are those that target information integrity 
(e.g. viruses) or seek to bring down a system (e.g. flooding attacks).  Some attacks, such 
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as Internet Protocol (IP) spoofing, focus on masquerading that can result in planting false 
information. Other attacks such as corrupting the translation tables of a Domain Name 
Server can cut off or hijack communication channels. Thus, the protection strategy for 
today's military operations must address not only confidentiality, but also the integrity, 
authenticity and timeliness of information, and continued availability of processing and 
communications capabilities. In addition, independent units must be acquainted with the 
fundamentals of information security procedures as they pertain to a potential attack of 
the systems on their platform. In the event of an information attack, individual units must 
understand what they should do and how those actions will impact the command and 
control process during the current mission. 
C.       INFORMATION SYSTEM SECURITY 
1. Major Challenges to Information Systems Security 
Maintaining the security of DoD C4I systems is a problem with two dimensions. 
The first dimension is physical. That is protecting the computers and communications 
links as well as command and control facilities from being physically destroyed or 
jammed. For this task, the military has a great deal of relevant experience that it applies 
to systems in the field. For example, the military knows to place key C4I nodes in well- 
protected areas with guards and other access control mechanisms in place to prevent 
sabotage, if required. However, information systems security, the other dimension, is a 
much more challenging task. Information systems security, the task of protecting the C4I 
systems connected to the communications network against an adversarial attack is much 
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more poorly understood than physical security. The issue of protecting DoD C4I systems 
against attack is complicated by the fact that many military C4I systems are 
interconnected with the civilian infrastructure. DoD is thus faced with the problem of 
relying on components of an infrastructure over which it does not have control. 
a.        Networked Systems 
The utility of an information or C4I system generally increases as the 
number of other systems to which it is connected increases. However, increasing the 
number of connections of a particular system to other systems also increase its 
vulnerability to attacks routed through those connections. This is especially true when 
information systems are networked through the Internet. It is desirable to use the Internet 
because it provides lower information transport costs then the public switched telephone 
network or dedicated systems. However, the use of the Internet to connect C4I systems 
poses special vulnerabilities and currently provides neither quality-of-service (QOS) 
guarantees nor good isolation from potentially hostile attacks. 
b. The Asymmetry Between Offensive and Defensive Information 
Warfare Security 
According to  Dorothy Denning,  author of Information  Warfare  and 
Security: 
Information warfare consists of offensive and defensive operations against 
information resources of a "win-lose" nature. It is conducted because 
information resources have value to people. Offensive operations aim to 
increase this value for the offense while decreasing it for the defense. 
Defensive operations seek to counter potential losses of value. (Denning, 
1998) 
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Information systems security is fundamentally a defensive function and as 
such suffers from an inherent asymmetry between cyber attack and cyber defense. 
Because cyber defense requires an organization to always be on guard, as opposed to the 
cyber-attack which can be conducted at the discretion of the attacker, it is often more 
expensive to implement a defensive posture and requires enormous amount of effort to 
eliminate security flaws and implement policy/procedure (e.g. INFOCON) aimed at 
immediate protection of resources and deterring an adversarial attack. In short, a 
successful defender must be successful against all attacks, regardless of where the attack 
occurs, the type of attack, or the time of the attack. In contrast, a successful attacker has 
only to succeed in one place at one time with one technique to create a potentially 
damaging impact on a critical operation. 
2.        Defensive Functions 
A number of defensive functions must be performed in an effective and 
coordinated fashion to ensure that information security is being taken seriously and 
conducted effectively. These functions include: 
a.        Monitor Indications and Warnings 
All defenses (physical and cyber) rely to some extent on indications and 
warnings of impending attack. The reason is that if it is known that attack is impending, 
the defense can take actions to reduce its vulnerability and to increase the effectiveness of 
its response. This function calls for: 
17 
•    Monitoring of threat indicators. For example, near simultaneous penetration attempts 
on multiple military information systems may reasonably be considered an indication 
of an orchestrated attack. The notion of an Information Condition (INFOCON) would 
be a useful summary device to indicate to commanders the state of cyber-threat at any 
given time.  INFOCON's provide a set of pre-established measures to assess threats 
against information systems and define graduated actions to be taken in response to 
those  threats.     INFOCON's  are  roughly  analogous  to  the  defense  condition 
(DEFCON) and terrorist condition (THREATCON) levels.  The decision to change 
the INFOCON level is based on the assessed threat, the capability to implement the 
required protective measures, and the overall impact the action will have on an 
organizations capability to perform its mission.       INFOCON's define appropriate 
information operations measures to be taken and are designed to produce detection, 
assessment, and response measures commensurate with the existing threat indicators. 
Chapter III discusses the details of INFOCON system implementations. 
•    Dissemination of information about the threat.  Knowledge of the techniques used in 
an attack on one information system may enable administrators responsible for other 
systems to take preventive actions tailored to that type of attack. 
b.        Plan a Range of Responses 
Organizations relying on information systems should have a number of 
routine information system security activities, e.g. security features that are turned on and 
security procedures like INFOCON's that are followed.  Tailoring in advance a range of 
18 
information systems security actions to be taken under different threat conditions would 
help an organization plan its response to any given attack. Further understanding the 
impact that implementing these specific security actions (e.g. INFOCON's) will have on 
command and control processes will permit commanders to more effectively maneuver 
during cyber threat conditions. 
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III. INFORMATION OPERATIONS CONDITION SYSTEM 
A.       PURPOSE 
Today, advanced U.S. information technology provides a decisive advantage to 
U.S. military forces through the integration of sensors, command and control systems, 
and weapon systems. Joint Vision 2010 articulates the future strategic importance of 
Information Superiority. This strategic importance brings with it the security 
vulnerabilities associated with information technology. DoD organizations present 
opportune targets for attack on information infrastructures. A host of potential 
adversaries, including novice computer hackers, disgruntled employees, non-state actors, 
and nation-state-sponsored organizations can exploit any information vulnerabilities. The 
existance of these information vulnerabilities demands an aggressive defensive 
Information Operation (10) and Information Security (INFOSEC) strategy to ensure 
combat readiness. 
The Information Operations Condition (INFOCON) system recommends actions 
to uniformly heighten or reduce defensive posture to defend against computer network 
attacks and to mitigate sustained damage to the DoD information infrastructure, including 
computer and telecommunications networks and systems. It provides a comprehensive 
defensive posture and response based on the status of information systems, military 
operations, and intelligence assessments of adversary capabilities and intent. The 
INFOCON system impacts all personnel who use DoD information systems.  It protects 
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systems while supporting mission objectives, and coordinates the overall defensive effort 
through adherence to standards. 
B.        INFOCON SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Memorandum CM-510-99, Appendix A, 
dated 10 Mar 1999, established INFOCON for the DoD. As implied above, the intent of 
the INFOCON system is to provide all DoD elements with a structured, standardized, 
coordinated approach to defend against and react to adversarial attacks on DoD computer 
and telecommunications networks and systems. While all communications systems are 
vulnerable to some degree, factors such as low-cost, readily available information 
technology, increased system connectivity, and standoff capability make computer 
network attack (CNA) an attractive option for our present adversaries. The INFOCON 
system describes increasing threat activities and the corresponding responses to defend 
against CNA and mitigate damage to the DoD information infrastructure. Appendix B, 
INFOCON Structure, supplied by the JTF-CND organization, provides criteria for the 
various INFOCON levels and is designed to assist decision-makers with appropriate 
response actions based on the perceived threat. Although INFOCON implementations 
chiefly focuses on the CNA aspect of Information Operations, the DoD INFOCON 
criteria and response actions may be expanded at a later date to include all forms of 
information operation conditions. 
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C.       LEVELS AND CRITERIA 
Three broad categories of factors influence the INFOCON: operational, technical, 
and intelligence. Changes to the INFOCON level are based upon significant changes in 
one or more of these categories. Some of the specific factors that may be considered 
when determining the INFOCON include the current world situation, a commander's 
assessment of the potential for an information attack, current/planned military operations, 
Information Assurance Vulnerability Alert (IAVA) bulletins, and operational impact 
assessments. 
Detailed INFOCON discussions with Ms. Regina Walker, a Computer Scientist 
assigned to the Operations Directorate in the Joint Information Operations Center (JIOC), 
indicate that five INFOCON levels currently exist. She stated that: 
The INFOCON system provides a standard and systematic approach to 
deal with the increasing problem of attacks on DoD networks. The five 
levels indicate the likelihood or severity of attack and provide guidance on 
what responsive measures should be implemented. While it is important 
that the appropriate INFOCON is declared, the ultimate success of the 
system depends upon thorough planning and rehearsal to best understand 
the implications that a particular INFOCON response will have on a 
specific command and control process. (Walker, 2000) 
Chief of Naval Operations message (181840Z May 99), Navy Information 
Operations Condition (INFOCON) Implementation, describes the five INFOCON levels 
as the following: (refer to Appendix B for a detailed description of the five INFOCON 
levels). 
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• NORMAL: There is no significant activity indicating an increased risk of 
attack. All mission-critical information on information systems and their operational 
importance should be identified. Points of access and their operational necessity 
should also be identified. Personnel should conduct normal security practices for 
their information systems, such as periodically reviewing and testing higher level 
INFOCON actions. 
• ALPHA: There is an increased risk of attack. Criteria for declaring this level 
include indications and warnings indicating a general threat, actions indicating a 
pattern of surveillance of information systems, and a military operation requiring 
increased security of information systems. Recommended response actions include 
increasing the application of general security practices, such as conducting an internal 
review of all critical systems. 
• BRAVO: There is a specific risk of attack. Criteria to consider before declaring 
this level include a network penetration or denial of service with no impact to DoD 
operations. Recommended response actions include increasing the application of 
general security practices, such as disconnecting unclassified dial-up connections not 
required for current operations. 
• CHARLIE: A limited information system attack has been detected. Criteria to 
consider before declaring this level include intelligence assessments indicating a 
limited attack and an information system attack with limited impact on DoD 
operations.     Recommended response actions  include  re-routing mission-critical 
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communications through unaffected systems and disconnecting non-mission-critical 
systems from networks. 
• DELTA: Information systems are under attack. There may be widespread 
incidents that undermine a system's ability to function effectively and result in a 
compromise and significant risk of mission failure. Recommended actions include 
isolating compromised systems from the rest of a network and implementing 
procedures for conducting operations in a stand-alone mode or manually. 
D.       RESPONSIVE MEASURES 
Responsive measures associated with INFOCON's are normally recommended 
actions unless specifically directed by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). These 
measures should be commensurate with the risk, an adversary's assessed capability, and 
intent and mission requirements. Dorothy E. Denning, a Professor of Computer Science 
at Georgetown University, highlights examples of CNA responsive measures in her 
book, Information Warfare and Security. She explains that: 
Several responsive measures associated with INFOCON implementations 
include isolating the affected network segment, blocking offending 
Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, recalling key information system security 
personnel, updating virus signature files, running virus 
detection/eradication software, and isolating compromised portions of 
affected systems. (Denning, 1998) 
She adds, "it should be noted that each responsive measure mentioned would have 
an impact on the flow of information and thus effect command and control in some 
capacity.     It is the  implementation of each responsive measure  and a complete 
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understanding of the effects that each response will have on specific decision making 
processes that must be explored and documented." (Denning, 1998) 
Ideally, computer network defense (CND) operations will be based on some 
advanced warning of an attack. For example, according to subject matter experts on the 
Commander Third Fleet (C3F) staff, "the intelligence community is developing a 
capability to provide CNA warning which will become of increasing value as it matures. 
This warning will provide a means for a commander to better assess the responsive 
measures needed to counter a hostile threat condition." There is a balancing act, however. 
Over-aggressive countermeasures may result in self-inflicted degradation of system 
performance  and  communications  ability,  which may ultimately contribute to the 
adversary's objectives.     Commanders must also consider the impact that imposing a 
higher INFOCON for their command will have on connectivity with computer networks 
and systems of other commands.   Although the commander has the final judgment for 
declaring an INFOCON posture, objective assessment of the situation and prudent 
analysis of all available objective information must be integrated with the commander's 
experience and leadership to determine the organization's appropriate defensive posture. 
E.        INFOCON IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS 
The INFOCON system is administered through the Joint Task Force - Computer 
Network Defense (JTF-CND), which was subordinated to USCINCSPACE on 1 Oct 99. 
Notification of a change in INFOCON status is disseminated from the JTF-CND to 
combatant commands  and agencies.  The commands and agencies are then responsible 
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for notifying units assigned to them of impending change. This notification includes the 
recommended or directed responsive measure. 
Commanders or Directors may change the INFOCON of their organizations but 
conditions implemented must remain at a level commensurate with the current 
INFOCON direction from the JTF-CND.   Ms. Walker (JIOC J3) commented that: 
when commanders consider imposing a higher INFOCON for their 
command, they should consider the impact their decision may have on 
connectivity with information networks of other commands. Responsive 
measures directed by combatant commanders will take precedence over 
responsive measures directed by Service INFOCON's. (Walker, 2000) 
All combatant commands, Services and defense and combat support agencies are 
required to develop supplemental INFOCON procedures, specific to their command and 
consistent with the guidance in CM-510-99. These procedures may include criteria for 
establishing an INFOCON level and recommended or required actions. Appendix C 
provides the COMTHIRDFLT/USS CORONADO (AGF-11) INFOCON standard 
operating procedure as an example of implementation and reporting guidance for a 
specific unit. 
F.   KEYS TO SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INFOCON 
SYSTEM 
1. System Interface Description 
It is critical that commands and agencies have a thorough understanding of the 
high-level   system  architecture  of all  networks  within  their  domain.   A  thorough 
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understanding of an organization's system architectures will assist in understanding 
potential operational impacts if the INFOCON is changed. Architectures should 
accurately show interfaces between component parts and connectivity to systems outside 
the domain. Component parts can represent any entity (e.g. unit, department, directorate, 
etc.) that is considered part of the domain. Architectures provide a mechanism for 
understanding and managing complexity. A mechanism that can be used to represent 
architectures is the Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Architecture Framework. The Framework 
provides the rules, guidance, and product descriptions for developing and presenting 
architecture descriptions that ensure a common denominator for understanding, 
comparing, and integrating architectures. One product that can be used to show interfaces 
between systems or component parts is called the System Interface Description. An 
example of a generic System Interface Description from the C4ISR Architecture Working 
Group (AWG), C4ISR Architecture Framework Version 2.0 document is shown in Figure 
1-1. 
Component A \ /   ComponentJ 
Figure 1-1. System Interface Description Example 
(From C4ISR Architecture Framework, 1998) 
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2.        System Communications Description 
In addition to understanding the high level architecture and interfaces, network 
administrators should be aware of all network components, external connections to the 
networks, and all applications and databases that reside on the networks they are 
responsible for. This is the only way to accurately predict the affect of applying a 
particular countermeasure. For example, it is possible to fail in isolating compromised 
portions of an affected system because network administrators are not aware of all paths 
between nodes and may unintentionally leave key links operational, vulnerable to the 
hostile threat. By effeciently documenting the electronic communication path, 
workarounds and procedures to continue effective operations during INFOCON can be 
planned well in advance of an attack. A C4ISR product, the System Communication 
Description, can be used to display the network infrastructure at particular locations. An 
example of this diagram, taken from the C4ISR Architecture Framework document, is 
shown in Figure 1-2. 
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Gateway Server PC 
Dial up Connection 
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Figure 1-2. System Communication Description Example 
(From C4ISR Architecture Framework, 1998) 
3. Operational Node Connectivity Description 
Once Networks are Defined, the support provided to military operations must be 
identified. In a recent interview with CDR (ret) Martin Greene, former Information 
Operations Officer on the COMTHIRDFLT staff and now INFOCON subject matter 
expert (SME) at the SPA WAR Information Operations Center of the Future (IOCOF) Lab 
in San Diego, he stated: 
When the time comes to actually disconnect a system from a network, one 
must fully understand the affect this action will have on operations. 
Therefore, an operational view of architectures that include all command 
and control nodes must be captured. (Greene, 2000) 
A simple C4ISR product that can be used in this effort is the Operational Node 
Connectivity Description. Figure 1-3 is an example of an Operational Node Connectivity 
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Description diagram taken from the C4ISR Architecture Framework document. This 
high-level diagram includes information exchanged between nodes or component parts 
and operational activities of each component part. Mr. Greene added: 
Once system and operational views of networks are defined, the 
information should be integrated and displayed in a manner that makes it 
relatively easy to determine which operational activities would be affected 
if a network access were denied during a specific INFOCON. (Greene, 
2000) 
ACTIVITIES 
> Activity 1 
> Activity 2 














> Activity I 
> Activity 2 
> Activity 3 
| Component C   I 
Info Exchange 







• Destination ACTIVITIES 
• Activity 1 
• Activity 2 
• Activity 3 
Figure 1-3. Operational Node Connectivity Description Example 
(From C4ISR Architecture Framework, 1999) 
In addition to fully understanding an organization's systems architecture as well as 
the command and control processes that integrate operational components, network 
administrators should understand their network bandwidth and throughput capabilities. 
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As stated in an article, Overview of Information Operations Condition (INFOCON), 
written for Cyber Sword by Ms. Regina Walker: 
Knowledge of 'normal' throughput will help determine the effect of 
countermeasures. For instance, rerouting the normal flow of traffic on a 
network may result in increased use of bandwidth on available links and 
delay the arrival of messages at their destinations. Knowledge of network 
throughput may also help determine when an attack, such as denial of 
service, is underway because the network is saturated by extraneous 
message traffic. (Walker, 1999) 
G.       SUMMARY 
The INFOCON system provides a standard and systematic approach to deal with 
the increasing problem of attacks on DoD networks. The five levels previously discussed 
indicate of the likelihood or severity of attack and provide guidance on what responsive 
measures should be implemented. While it is important that the appropriate INFOCON is 
declared, the ultimate success of the system depends upon thorough planning, rehearsal, 
execution, and daily vigilance. 
INFOCON actions should be reviewed and tested often. This will help personnel 
understand their roles and responsibilities, determine the effect of responsive measures in 
an artificial environment, and detect problems in existing procedures. A recent 
experiment that the author participated in was conducted at the SPA WAR IOCOF with 
COMTHIRDFLT staff officers. The primary objective of the experiment was to 
investigate the relationship between military INFOCON's and their impact on warfighter's 
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ability to conduct operational command and control tasks.     Chapter IV is a detailed 
review of this initial laboratory INFOCON experiment. 
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IV. SPAWAR INFORMATION OPERATIONS COMMAND AND CONTROL 
(IO/C2) EXPERIMENT: THE IMPACT OF INFOCON LEVELS ON 
SIMULATED FLEET OPERATIONS 
A.       EXPERIMENT OVERVIEW 
1.        Operational Background 
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Memorandum dated 10 March 
1999 (CM-510-99) established the Information Operations Condition (INFOCON) system 
for the Department of Defense (DoD). The policy contained in this document focused 
specifically on defense against attacks on DoD computer networks. These computer 
network attacks are a subset of the broader discipline of Information Operations (10). 
INFOCON actions were designed to heighten or reduce the defensive posture against 
computer network attacks, and to mitigate sustained damage to DoD computer 
infrastructures. 
Given the CJCS Memorandum focus and the obvious need for data to support 
policy decisions, SPAWAR Systems Center (SSC) San Diego hosted an Information 
Operations/Information Assurance (IO/IA) symposium, which the author attended, in 
October 1999. During this event, several organizations agreed to form a partnership in 
support of an ambitious program of experiments designed to better understand the impact 
of the INFOCON's on Fleet command and control processes. The partners included SSC 
San Diego; SPAWAR, PMW-161; the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV), N-64; the 
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Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC); and the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (DARPA). 
Commander THIRD Fleet (C3F) staff officers participated in the initial 10 C2 
experiment. C3F routinely operates as both a Numbered Fleet Commander and 
Commander Joint Task Force (CJTF). During normal operations and exercises, the Battle 
Watch Captain (BWC) is the Commander's direct representative and the Battle Watch 
team interacts at an operational level with other C3F staff elements and external 
command staffs and watch teams. 
As shown in the Figure 4-1, the SSC San Diego Information Operations Center of 
the Future (IOCOF) was configured as the USS CORONADO Joint Operations Center 
(JOC) for this 10 C2 Experiment. Normal systems and communications paths were 
Figure 4-1. IOCOF USS CORONADO JOC Configuration 
(From SPAWAR10 C2 Experiment Brief, 2000) 
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available to watch Standers to accomplish their mission with the exception of typical ship 
voice communications (e.g UHF/SHF/EHF). The SSC experiment planners decided to 
substitue Microsoft's NetMeeting in the experiement to enable a more robust 
reconstruction and more accurate watch Stander evaluation. Tasks performed by the 
watch teams were identical to those tasks usually performed on watch in the JOC. This 
parallel structure between normal C3F staff operations and the experiment ensured 
realistic experimental fidelity. However, during a recent interview with Dr. George 
Seymour, 10 C2 Experiment Senior Analyst, he stated: 
This experiment evaluated a staff that is not concerned with the details of 
individual ship or other unit opertions, postitions, reports, logistics, etc. 
Instead, the operational commander is concerned with the aggregate 
performace of subordinate warfare commanders, who in turn rely on more 
detailed information to perform their mission. Therefore, the findings of 
this experiment should not be used to infer the impact of INFOCON's on 
other operational staffs outside the Battle Watch organization. Any 
assessment of INFOCON impacts on other staffs must be made 
independently. (Seymour, 2000) 
The experiment used a naval scenario based in the South China Sea to provide a 
realistic operational setting for the Battle Watch participants. Pre-recorded Global 
Command and Control System Maritime (GCCS-M) track data provided a tactical picture 
for each watch. The scenario varied slightly from watch to watch to maintain operator 
interest and focus. Unlike a wargame that uses the scenario to drive a winning solution 
for the participants, this scenario served more as a backdrop, providing a context for 
routine Battle Watch actions. This allowed the experiment to focus on the variation 
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caused by the INFOCON level in effect for each watch. Each session represented a 
nominal 0400-0800 Battle Watch in an operational CJTF environment familiar to the 
participants. The emphasis was on conducting the watch rather than fighting the war as is 
the case in a typical wargame. Dr. Seymour explained that "the scenario events 
purposefully were not cumulative." (Seymour, 2000) That is, scenario events were 
independent for each watch period. The variable from watch to watch was the INFOCON 
level and attendant impacts on networks and tools available to the Battle Watch in the 
JOC. 
2.        Objective 
The primary objective of this initial IO C2 experiment was to investigate the 
impact of military INFOCON's on the warfighter's ability to conduct operational C2 tasks. 
The key warfighting capability addressed was the ability of the staff to continue mission 
performance in a command and control center under network threats or attacks and the 
subsequent actions resulting from setting of INFOCON levels commensurate with the 
threat. Specific experiment capabilities were dependent on the particular function (e.g. 
J2, J3, 36, etc.) and the particular tasks associated with that function. Based on the 
experiment architecture and scenarios, the objectives as indicated in the SPA WAR IA C2 
Experiment Test Plan were to determine the following: 
• What impact on the warfighter's C2 capability does a particular INFOCON have? 
• What tasks cannot be completed as a result of a particular INFOCON setting? 
• Is there an increase in time to complete a specific task? 
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•    What workarounds do warfighter's employ to enable them to carry out their 
mission? 
A secondary objective of the experiment was to create a realistic warfighting 
environment and foster a contextual awareness among the participants about INFOCON 
implications. We were tasked to quantify capabilities lost, verify C2 and Situational 
Awareness (SA) impact due to INFOCON level, and then identify workarounds that 
might be used during actual INFOCON situations. These objectives implied the need for 
quantitative measures for "impact" and "SA", as well as structured open-ended questions 
about related topics. 
3.        Scientific Background 
a. Workload Measurements 
According to H.G. Hart and L.E. Staveland, "the typical assumption in 
cognitive research is that workload is a hypothetical construct that represents the cost 
incurred by a human operator to achieve a particular level of performance." (Hart & 
Staveland, 1988) In preparing the plan to conduct this experiment, Dr. George Seymour 
wrote that "this common assumption implies that work is both more human-centered than 
task-centered, and that the subjective experience of work will be different for different 
people concerning the same task." (Seymour, 2000) For these reasons, the decision was 
made by the experiment planning team to use the NASA Task Load Index (TLX) as a 
measure of warfighter impact.    In this model of work, workload is not an inherent 
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property of work but rather an interaction between the work requirement and the 
perception of the worker. 
The NASA Task Load Index is a thoroughly studied, multi-dimensional, 
subjective rating procedure that affords an overall workload score based on the weighted 
average of six sub-scale ratings: (1) Mental Demands, (2) Physical Demands, (3) 
Temporal Demands, (4) Performance, (5) Effort, and (6) Frustration. This rating system 
was used to determine the workload that subjects felt they were exposed to during the 
course of the experiment. The NASA TLX procedure relates workload demands imposed 
on the subjects and the interaction of the subject to the task. Mental, physical, and 
temporal demands relate to the demands imposed on the participant from exterior 
sources, while the other three, performance, effort, and frustration, relate to the 
interaction of the participant with the task they are performing. In addition to the six 
scale score, a weighted measure of task load can be calculated based on the sub-scales. 
Definitions for each of the six sub-scales are shown in Appendix D. 
b.        SituationalAwareness Measurements 
Another critical component of this research effort involved Situational 
Awareness (SA). According to Dr. W.G Kemple and Professor S. Hutchins from the 
Naval Postgraduate School (Evaluating Human Performance in Command and Control 
Environments), "SA refers to the decision maker's moment-by-moment ability to monitor 
and understand the state of the complex system and its environment. Generally speaking, 
the concept of S A refers to the mental process of knowing what is going on at any point 
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and time in the surrounding environment." (Kemple & Hutchins, 1999) Traditionally, 
human factor researchers have focused on awareness as explicit knowledge that is created 
through an interaction between a subject and the environment. SA is important in 
military decision making for several reasons. It provides the foundation for subsequent 
decision making and action selection in complex, dynamic environments. When 
emergencies arise, the completeness and accuracy of the decision maker's SA are critical 
to the ability to make decisions, revise plans, and manage the system. Finally, 
maintaining accurate SA is critical for conducting coordinated operations involving 
shared command and control resources. 
A Framework of Awareness for Small Groups in Shared Workspace, a 
Technical Report by C. Gutwin and S. Greenberg, identified four fundamental 
characteristics that distinguish awareness from other kinds of knowing. Their discussion 
of the four characteristics follows. (Gutwin & Greenberg, 1999) 
• Awareness is knowledge about the state of some environment, a setting 
bounded in time and space. For example, the environment might be the 
airspace that an air traffic controller is responsible for, and his/her knowledge 
might include aircraft headings, altitudes, and separation, and whether these 
factors imply a safe or unsafe situation. 
• Environments change over time so awareness is knowledge that must be 
maintained and kept up-to-date. Environments may change at different rates, 
but in all cases a person must continually gather new information and update 
what they already know. 
• People interact with the environment, and the maintenance of awareness is 
accomplished through this interaction. People gather information from the 
environment through sensory perception, and actively explore their 
surroundings based on information they pick up. 
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Awareness is almost always part of some other activity. That is, maintaining 
awareness is rarely the primary goal of the activity. The goal is to complete 
some task in the environment. 
Despite its almost universal appeal in the military, there is little consensus 
about the assessment method or measurement of SA. For that reason, the experiment 
planning team decided to let each of the participants, senior naval officers with extensive 
tactical experience in command center functions, estimate his own awareness level, but 
under structured conditions. At the end of each watch, each participant was asked to 
complete a Situational Awareness form to provide this estimate. A scale anchored 
between 1 (poor) and 10 (outstanding) was used and that signified each participants SA 
at that point in time. As mentioned above, the measure was obtained at the end of each 
watch before any group discussion or subject matter expert (SME) feedback. At the same 
time, each participant was asked to identify his C2 capability using the same anchored 
scale. In addition to the participants providing their own assessment of SA at the end of 
each watch, two SME facilitators provided as assessment of SA for each participant based 
on interactions with the participants during and at the end of each watch. The SME's 
used the same anchored scale from 1 to 10. 
B.        EXPERIMENT DESIGN 
1. Experiment Architecture 
"Defining the test bed C4I architecture was a compromise between credibility, 
complexity and cost effectiveness.   It was important that the results of the experiment 
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stand up to both technical scrutiny and, more importantly, to operator scrutiny." 
(Seymour, 2000) Although the test bed infrastructure did not permit the installation of a 
complete Command Ship C4I suite, it did replicate a representative cross section of the 
fielded computers and communications suites on the C3F Command ship. This permitted 
a reasonably large number of Battle Watch personnel to operate in the lab for the scenario 
periods as if they were embarked on an actual Navy command ship. The test bed, for all 
practical purposes, was a representative Navy command ship operational space, populated 
with operational systems and driven by realistic data. Using this environment facilitated 
the immersion of operators into an experience that both supports the collection of 
experimental data and serves as the basis for the development of future Information 
Operations (I/O) doctrine and tactics. 
In most cases test bed servers were normal PCs or UNIX workstations that 
represented the hardware in the Fleet. The focus was to run the fielded server software, or 
a more cost-effective solution as appropriate, to achieve representative functionality. 
Figure 4-2 illustrates the location and tools available to each experiment participant. 
Figure 4-3 provides a diagram of the experimental Joint Operations Center big screen 
displays configured for this experiment. 
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Figure 4-2. Experimental Joint Operations Center (JOC) Configuration 
(From 10 C2 Experiment Test Plan. 2000) 
Experimental JOC Display Setup 
CNN 





Two large displays also used for briefings and 
display of other systems, as required 
Sources: 
CNN - from SAT TV receiver 
METOC - SIPRNET workstation with video card 
GCCS AIR - mirror of AIR watch workstation 
GCCS SURF - mirror of SURF watch workstation 
Exercise Clock - workstation with video card 
Status - workstation with video card 
Figure 4-3. Experimental Joint Operations Center Display Configuration 
(From 10 C2 Experiment Test Plan, 2000) 
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a.        Experimental UNCLASSIFIED Network 
The experimental UNCLASSIFIED network configuration 
capabilities are listed below and illustrated in Figure 4-4. This information was provided 
by the SPA WAR IOCOF experiment support personnel. 
• SailorNet workstations 
- Used for sailor unclassified email and web surfing 
- Simulated Legal, Public Affairs, Medical unclassified systems 
- Personal Computer (PC) running Windows NT Workstation 
• Assistant Battle Watch Captain workstation 
- Used of unclassified email and web surfing 
• Web proxy server 
- Provided network address translation and access to the Internet for   live 
network connection 
UNCLASSIFIED WAN 
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Figure 4-4.   Experimental Unclassified Network Configuration 
(From 10 C2 Experiment Test Plan, 2000) 
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b.        Experimental SECRET Network 
The experimental SECRET network configuration capabilities are 
listed below and illustrated in Figure 4-5. This information was provided by the 
SPA WAR IOCOF experiment support personnel. 
• Exchange Server 
- PC running Windows NT (WinNT) Server 4.0 and Microsoft Exchange 
• File Server 
- PC running WinNT Server 4.0 
• NT Primary Domain Controller 
- PC running WinNT 4.0 
• Global Command and Control System Maritime (GCCS-M) Servers 
- JOTS-1, JOTS-14, JOTS-19 
- HP UNIX system 
• Web Server 
• PC's (6) for JOC BWC and anchor modules 
- WinNT Workstation running Microsoft Office, Microsoft Outlook, web 
browser, file server access, C2PC or equivalent functionality, shared log 
system, Microsoft NetMeeting to simulate voice communications 
• GCCS-M workstations (3) 
• CTAPS Workstation (1) 
• Proxy Server 
- Provided network address translation and access to SIPRNET for live network 
connection 
- Simulated SIPRNET WAN problems and implemented INFOCON SIPRNET 
disconnect 
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PC running WinNT 4.0 and Microsoft Proxy Server 
Repeat System 
Used to inject pre-recorded message traffic into GCCS-M system to simulate 
operational data flow 
PC running WinNT 4.0 
EXPERIMENT SECRET WAN 
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Figure 4-5.   Experimental SECRET Network Configuration 
(From 10 C2 Experiment Test Plan, 2000) 
2. Experiment Participants 
a. Test Subjects 
Seven test subjects, one at each computer workstation, participated in this 
realistic simulation of the C3F Joint Operations Center.   The participants were senior 
naval officers who were fully qualified and experienced with the duties in the JOC. "The 
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officers who served as participants had a combined total military experience of 126 years, 
and their mean age was 39.3 years." (Seymour, 2000) The participant's professional 
disciplines consisted of three Surface Warfare Officers (SWO), two Cryptology Officers, 
one Intelligence Officer, and one Limited Duty Officer (LDO) specializing in cryptology. 
These officers typically worked together as part of a team on the C3F Flagship. 
b. Observers 
Four  independent  observers  monitored  the   experiment  and  logged 
subjective comments during each watch. The author participated in this capacity 
throughout the effort. Each observer was assigned to monitor two adjacent workstations 
of the experiment, and distribute and collect data forms during each phase of the 
experiment. Each observer underwent an hour of training in group session to familiarize 
each with the scenarios for each watch, as well as the data collection instruments and 
timing. 
c. Subject Matter Experts (SME 's) 
Two SME's acted as experiment facilitators.   Both SME's had extensive 
experience as naval officers in the skills and requirements for JOC watch Standers. The 
facilitators provided the watch team with the typical information given to a JOC watch 
team as "pass down" before assuming the watch. The information included daily brief 
guidance and the current events that were being monitored in the JOC. In addition, the 
SME's were responsible for assessing the watch team situational awareness at the 
conclusion of each watch. 
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3.        Role-Based Functionality 
The Joint Operations Center (JOC) serves as the focal point for senior decision- 
makers aboard Flagships like the USS CORONADO. However, the majority of the C4I 
functionality and operations for C3F are carried out in other operational spaces. For 
example operations efforts are also conducted in the Joint C4I Coordination Center 
(JCCC), Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC), Joint Intelligence Support Element (JISE), 
and the Tactical Flag Command Center (TFCC). Interfaces between the JOC and these 
other supporting organizations are primarily via voice communications, shared logs and 
email. The experimental architecture provided a simulated interaction with these other 
organizations via email, message traffic, shared logs and GCCS track updates. The 
architecture supported positions modeled from the C3F JOC. The experiment watch 
positions with respective network connectivity capabilities is shown in Table 4-1. 























X X X X 
Air Watch 
X X X X X X 
USW 
Watch 
X X X X X X 
J2 Anchor 
Module X X X X X X 
J6 Anchor 
Module X X X X X X 
J4 Anchor 
Module X X X X X X X 
49 
4. Variables 
The independent variable for the experiment, INFOCON level, was defined at the 
start of each Watch, and operationalized by manipulating or reducing networked 
communication capability in increasing steps in accordance with the C3F INFOCON 
Instruction (see Appendix C). Similar to the Fleet and joint operational counterpart, the 
experiment INFOCON levels range from Normal through Delta, and were varied one 
level (Watch) at a time. Its imposition was explicit to the participants at the start of each 
watch and remained constant throughout that watch. 
Four dependent variables were measured at the end of each watch. These 
included: Workload Impact, Situational Awareness, C2 Capability, and Time Delta as 
measured by asking the test subjects to estimate how much longer it took each to 
complete their task under each INFOCON condition when compared to INFOCON 
Normal. 
5. Procedure 
Five different watches, each lasting approximately three hours and corresponding 
to the five INFOCON levels, were conducted. Appendix F shows the experimental task 
and procedure flow for each of the five watches, as well as their data collection points. 
Watch One (INFOCON Normal) was used as a training exercise and served mainly as an 
introduction to the subsequent four watches. Watches two thorough five represented 
INFOCON levels Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, and Delta, in order of presentation and where an 
increasingly restrictive network posture was implemented. 
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The NASA Task Load Index (TLX) is a subjective rating procedure that was used 
to measure each participant's workload assessment during the varying INFOCON levels. 
The NASA TLX is a two-part assessment process consisting of both task weightings and 
task ratings. Figure 4-6 and Figure 4-7 are the TLX Factoring forms that were used to 
collect the weightings from each test subject after the INFOCON Normal watch. 
Workload Instrumentation 
TLX Factoring: Part A 
First, before we start the experiment, think about the work you typically 
perform at your computer workstation during normal operational conditions 
at sea. Then, using the TLX Work Scale Definitions that you just read, think 
about, which of the following aspects of your work are the most important 
contributors to    your wnrklnaH     during a typical operational day. 
MENTAL DEMAND = MD 
PHYSICAL DEMAND = PD 
TEMPORAL DEMAND = TD 
EFFORT = EF 
PERFORMANCE = O P 
FRUSTRATION LEVEL = FR 
With that in mind, and using the two letter codes above, choose the one 
letter pair from each pairing below that is most important to your workload 
(workload centrality). In other words, if the physical demand (PD) of your 
typical workload is more important each day than the mental demand (MD), 
circle the PD in the upper left pairing below. Continue to make your choices 
for all 15 pairings. 
PD / MD TD / PD TD / FR 
TD / MD OP / PD TD / EF 
OP / MD FR / PD OP / FR 
FR / MD EF / PD OP / EF 
EF / MD TD / OP EF / FR 
Date/Time:  
Workstation: 
Figure 4-6.      TLX Task Weighting Instrument - Part A 
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Workload Instrumentation 
TLX Factoring: Part B 
Next, think about the work you typically perform at your computer 
workstation during normal operational conditions at sea. Then, using 
the TLI Work Scale Definitions that you read previously, think about 
which of the following aspects of your workload change the most 
during a typical operational day. 
MENTAL DEMAND = MD 
PHYSICAL DEMAND = PD 
TEMPORAL DEMAND = TD 
EFFORT = EF 
PERFORMANCE = OP 
FRUSTRATION LEVEL = FR 
With that in mind, and using the two letter codes above, choose the 
one letter pair from each pairing below that changes the most 
(workload variation). In other words, if the physical demand (PD) of 
your typical work varies more each day than the mental demand (MD), 
circle the PD in the upper left pairing below. Continue to make your 
choices for all 15 pairings. 
PD / MD TD / PD TD / FR 
TD /MD OP / PD TD / EF 
OP / MD FR / PD OP / FR 
FR / MD EF / PD OP / EF 
EF / MD TD / OP EF / FR 
Date/Time:   
Workstation: 
Figure 4-7.      TLX Task Weighting Instrument - Part B 
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The first part of the TLX process required participants  to make a choice between 
each pair combination among the six sub-scales shown in the figures above. This was 
accomplished after the first INFOCON session (Normal). Each test subject was asked to 
consider which "aspects of your work were the most important contributors to your 
workload." (Hart & Staveland, 1988) then fill out the forms above. This helped obtain a 
numerical rating for each scale that reflected the magnitude ofthat workload factor in a 
given task. 
The second part of the process required each individual to evaluate the 
contribution of each workload factor to the total workload of a specific task. The 
weighting score provided an indication of the importance of each dimension, relative to 
the other dimension to the overall task. "The weighting accounts for two potential 
sources of differences between raters: differences in workload definition within a task and 
differences in the sources of workload between tasks." (Hart & Staveland, 1988) Figure 
4-8 shows the TLX rating scale forms that each participant completed at the conclusion of 
each watch. 
6. Tasks 
Each of the five watches, corresponding to the five INFOCON levels, consisted of 
an approximately three hour scenario-driven set of events typically found on Navy 
command ships. Appendix F, IA C2 IOCOF experiments design & data collection flow 




TLX Rating Scales 
Use the following six scales to evaluate [ l=(LOW) to 10 =(HIGH) ] the work you have been 
doing during the past few hours. Place a check mark (4) on each line below, and also write the 
corresponding whole number (1 through 10) to the right of each scale. 
MENTAL DEMAND 
I   I   I   1   I   1   I   1   I   1   I   1   I   1   I 
Low 
PHYSICAL DEMAND 
I   I   1   I   I   I   I   I 
Low 
TEMPORAL DEMAND 
I   1   I   I   1   I   I 
Low 
PERFORMANCE 
I   I   1   I   1   I   1   I 
Good 
EFFORT 
I   I   I   I   I   I   I 
LOW 
FRUSTRATION 






i   I  i   I   I 
Poor 
I   i   I   i   I   I   I   I 
High 
i   I  i hlil 
Low 
Low / Poor = 1 
At this time, what is your most important task: 
High 
High / Good = 10 
Using a scale from 1 (poor) to 10 (excellent), what is your current task-related Situation 
Awareness level:  
At this time, what is your estimate of the amount of INCREASED time that it will take you to 





Figure 4-8.      TLX Rating Scales Form 
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a situation brief from the off-going watch (Subject Matter Expert) to set the stage/course 
of action for the test subjects. The command and control systems were configured to 
match the experimental threat condition/INFOCON level and the participants executed a 
specific set of tasks based on the operational requirements of the scenario. 
To ensure adequate contextual realism for the experiment, the test subjects and 
SME's were responsible for completing three distinct measurement tasks during each 
watch that provided data used in the analysis effort. Metrics for this experiment were 
designed and instituted by Dr. George Seymour from SSC San Diego. The following 
provides an excerpt from Dr. Seymour's experiment write up that discusses the approach 
used to help measure situational awareness for this experiment. (Seymour, 2000) 
1. Commander's Daily Brief Preparation Support. The military watch selected for this 
experiment (0400-0800) corresponds to the period when a briefer would query the 
Battle Watch for current information to support the preparation of the daily brief. The 
test subjects were tasked to complete a daily brief information matrix that provided a 
measure of the watch's ability to ascertain what had occurred during the watch in all 
areas of concern to the JTF Commander. This information was reported by the JOC 
approximately two-thirds of the way through each Watch. The SME's used this 
information to estimate the overall situational awareness of each Watch using a scale 
from 1 (poor) to 10 (outstanding). 
2. Commander's Daily Intentions Message Support. Each test subject was tasked to 
provide inputs to the Commander's daily intentions message at the end of each Watch. 
By supplying this information, the Battle Watch team demonstrated its specific 
understanding of the impact on future operations and thus offered a recommended 
priority the Commander could take in order to respond effectively to mission 
requirements. The SME's used this information in their estimate of the overall 
situational awareness of each Watch, again a scale of 1 to 10. 
3. Off-going Watch Pass Down. At the conclusion of each watch period the test 
subjects provided an off-going brief to the 'relieving' watch team (SME's). This brief 
verified each participant's situational awareness at the conclusion of that watch. This 
pass down mimics a real watch-standing requirement, and thus afforded the 
facilitators a chance to extract and refine lessons learned from each watch.   The 
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SME's  used  this  information  to  further  evaluate  each  participant's  situational 
awareness during each watch, using a scale from 1 (poor) to 10 (outstanding). 
Situational Awareness was measured in three ways. First, by asking each test 
subject to provide an estimate of his own SA at the end of each watch, second, by having 
the SME facilitators estimate the SA of each subject at the end of each watch, and third 
by having the SME's provide a single estimate of the watch team overall SA at the end of 
each watch. These scales ranged from 1 (poor) to 10 (outstanding). 
Prior to the commencing the experiment, test subjects were provided an adequate 
period of training time to become familiar with the experimental tools and task 
expectations. After test subjects were familiar with their respective tasks, a set of 
weightings was obtained which described how each subject related to his specific task 
(refer to Figures 4-6 and 4-7). Dr Seymour stated that: 
Prior to obtaining the workload scores (ratings) at the end of each watch, 
each participant provided work factor weightings that identified the 
relative weight of each work dimension to the overall task. These 
weightings explicitly acknowledge that work is a combination of external 
influences and internal perceptions, and thus likely to differ from person to 
person." (Seymour, 2000) 
The six TLX scales, taken two at a time required fifteen choices by each test 
subject. After the choices, each subject assigned a weighting factor ranging from 0 to 5 
for each of the six scales. The weighting factors were used to weight the participant's 
workload scores that were collected at the end of each watch. Each score was multiplied 
by its corresponding weigghting factor and the results summed. Test participant's 
completed the workload score form at the completion of each of the five watches. 
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C.        RESULTS 
Measures for Workload Impact, Situational Awareness, C2 Capability, and Time 
Impact data were collected at the end of each Watch using the forms described in the 
previous section. These data were analyzed separately and are reported below. 
1.        Workload Impact 
Prior to obtaining the workload scores (ratings) at the end of each watch, each test 
subject completed several TLX workload factoring forms that provided work factor 
weightings and identified that subject's relative weight of each scale to the overall task 
(refer to Figures 4-6 and 4-7). Subject's weightings were multiplied by their respective 
workload rating for each scale for each watch. These products were summed across 
scales and participants within watches and provide the basic workload data points for this 
experiment. Figure 4-9 provides the mean workload values as assessed by the NASA 
TLX, for all five Watches. "These data represent the weighted sums across seven 
participants within each INFOCON level. The mean workload scores ranged from a low 
at INFOCON BRAVO to its highest level at NORMAL." (Seymour, 2000) It should be 
observed that the workload during INFOCON Alpha is higher than INFOCON Bravo. 
However, this could be attributed to experimental learning. The test participants may not 
have been thoroughly familiar with the experimental tools during INFOCON Alpha and 


















0 Normal    Alpha     Bravo      Charlie     Delta 
INFOCON STATUS 
Figure 4-9.      Impact of Increasing INFOCON Levels on JOC Workload 
(From SPA WAR 10 C2 Brief, 2000) 
2. Situational Awareness 
Situational Awareness (SA) and command and control (C2) were assessed by 
asking the participants to provide their own estimates at the end of each watch, before any 
group discussion. Hence, these remain relatively independent measures, free from group 
bias. Each participant provided a number between 1 (poor) and 10 (outstanding). The 
mean scores for both SA and C2 for each watch are shown in Figure 4-10. This figure 
indicates that the JOC situational awareness (SA), as well as the teams C2 capability, 
increased steadily through INFOCON Bravo, then it decreased for INFOCON Charlie, 
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Figure 4-10.    Impact of Increasing INFOCON Levels on Situational Awareness (Series 1) 
and C2 Capability (Series 2) (From SPA WAR 10 C2 Brief, 2000) 
3. Time Delta 
Decision makers (e.g. Commanders, policy makers, network administrators, etc.) 
share an equal interest in knowing if and how much increased time will be necessary to 
complete operational or mission-related tasks when networked resources are diminished 
or curtailed. That is especially true for tactical C2 tasks. Therefore, each participant was 
asked to track the additional time it took to complete similar tasks under various 
INFOCON level implementations. The comparison point was INFOCON Normal. 
Figure 4-11 shows the average of the participant's time estimates to complete tasks at 
each INFOCON level. Figure 4-11 also shows that the least impact in terms of increased 
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operational time to complete the mission was during INFOCON Bravo, whereas the most 
additional time reported to complete the JOC mission-related tasks was during 
INFOCON Delta. These results correlate to the Workload and Situational Awareness 





















Bravo Charlie Delta 
INFOCOK STATUS 
Participant Estimates of Increased Time to Complete Tasks 
(From SPA WAR 10 C2 Brief, 2000) 
4. Lessons Learned 
Participant's provided subjective comments that were reviewed after the 
experiment. Because of the participant's military experience and seniority, their 
comments and perspective provided a valuable source of information about the impact of 
INFOCON's on tactical C2 operations. From these comments we learned that: 
-    INFOCON's will impact their C2 work 
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- Impact is dependent on the specific C2 task 
- Formal IA training is practically negligible 
- Until INFOCON Charlie or Delta, C2 functions can be supported 
In addition, from conversations with the experiment participant's, subject matter 
experts, and observers, it is clear that any impact of INFOCON status will not be uniform 
across naval environments. 
Apparently, from these findings, many tactical C2 tasks can be performed 
at INFOCON levels Alpha and Bravo with no serious consequences. At 
the same time, depending on how long any INFOCON lasts, important 
ship functions, including logistics, medical, and email connectivity for the 
crew, would suffer at INFOCON Alpha or Bravo. Clearly, additional 
research is required to address these issues. (Seymour, 2000) 
Both additional experimental (laboratory) and new operational exercise and 
survey research is needed to explore the questions that surfaced, yet remained 
unanswered, from this effort. 
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V.       INFOCON FIELD EXPERIMENTATION METHODOLOGY 
Sufficient training, including realistic exercises that simulate peacetime 
and wartime stresses, shall be conducted to ensure that commanders of 
U.S. Armed Forces are well-informed about trade-offs among affecting, 
exploiting, and destroying adversary information systems, as well as the 
varying capabilities and vulnerabilities of DoD information systems. (Joint 
Doctrine for Information Operations, 1998) 
A.       FIELD SETTING OVERVIEW 
1. Exercises Versus Experiments 
Exercises and experiments are both intimately tied to doctrine, but they have 
fundamentally different purposes. The purpose of an exercise is to train units to fight in 
accordance with established military doctrine and existing procedures. That is, a unit 
engages in exercises in order to develop and maintain the ability to apply doctrinal 
principles to prevail in war. They maintain readiness through training. An exercise is 
typically designed so the units being trained will succeed and is conducted with certain 
training goals in mind. According to the Naval Research Council study, Realizing the 
Potential of C4I, "The purpose of an experiment is to explore alternative doctrine, 
operational concepts, and tactics that are enabled by new technologies or required by new 
situations." (NRC, 1998) That is, new technologies, procedures, or situations like 
INFOCON implementations may call for different ways of conducting operations under 
certain conditions. However, without actual operational experience in using new 
technologies or procedures, experiments are needed that will provide a basis for making 
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informed decisions and ultimately for identifying doctrinal changes that will support 
today's warfighter. 
2. Laboratory Experiment to Operational Environment 
Any type of experimentation, to be successful, requires a great deal of 
planning for capture of data and subsequent analyses. Both must be linked 
to a set of learning objectives. There is a progression of types of 
experiments, from those that are simple to plan to those that tax the most 
ingenious minds. (Schacher and Gallup, 2000) 
If one moves from the laboratory to the operational environment, experimentation 
becomes more difficult. This is due in a large part to lack of control over the 
environment. The term control is used in several different senses in experimental design. 
One sense refers to the ability to control the situation in which an experiment is being 
conducted so as to keep out extraneous factors that could impact the outcome of the 
experiment and lead to incorrect causal inference. Laboratory experiments offer a better 
opportunity to implement this type of control to obtain a desired result. However, 
because control over independent variables in field experiment design are difficult to 
implement, researchers must anticipate causal inference under operational conditions. 
If humans are part of the experiment, or if environmental conditions are changing, 
control is very complicated and methods to capture the human-in-the-loop interactions 
within the environment are difficult to implement. "One has to develop means for 
accounting for the variability of human behavior, or set up environment controls within 
which human interactions can be investigated." (Schacher and Gallup, 2000) A 
researchers central concern prior to collecting data for analyses must be a complete 
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understanding of the operational environment. In addition, repeatability, the ability to 
obtain like results from multiple experiment runs, is very diffiult in field environmental 
experiments. Hence, obtaining similar results to answer the overall objectives of the 
experiment multiple times may mean waiting for the right conditions to occur. 
B.        MODULAR COMMAND AND CONTROL EVALUATION SYSTEM 
The Modular Command and Control Evaluation System (MCES) is a general C3 
evaluation model developed by several Military Operations Research Society (MORS) 
command and control experts. This approach provides a series of seven modules 
conducted in an iterative process to evaluate alternative C3 systems and architectures. 
The seven modules include problem formulation, system bounding, process 
identification, measurement identification, data collection, and data aggregation. The 
author chose to use the MCES methodology as the framework for discussing an 
INFOCON experiment in a field setting. Figure 5-1 illustrates the MCES structure. 
When expanding the INFOCON laboratory experiment to a field environment, the 
MCES methodology will help planners and analysts develop an experimental design that 
will ultimately capture the data required to support the analysis of the relevant 
experimental questions. The MCES presents a method to attack difficult concepts in a 
standardized manner. "Ultimately the MCES can be thought of as two processes, a 
managerial system which serves as a guide to specifying the problem to be analyzed, and 
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Figure 5-1. Modular Command and Control Evaluation Structure (MCES) 
(From MCES Methodology, 1986) 
C.        INFOCON PROBLEM FORMULATION 
The MCES process begins by identifying the objective of a particular application 
like an INFOCON implementation, which leads to the first module, problem formulation. 
For example, if a commander wants to know the C2 implications of an INFOCON 
implementation on his Battle Watch Staff or his logistics organization, then that 
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experimental requirement must be articulated. The INFOCON operational and 
deployment concepts, environmental factors, scenarios, assumptions and threats must be 
made explicit to clearly formulate the problem. In this module, both the appropriate 
mission and scenario within the context of the experiment are made explicit. During the 
10 C2 laboratory experiment described in Chapter IV, the problem articulated was to 
identify the Battle Watch Staff capabilities and time lost due to INFOCON 
implementations and to document C2 and situational awareness impacts due to those 
specific implementations. Similarly, this problem could be expanded to an operational 
environment. Hence, the data that was collected and analyzed in the laboratory 
environment can serve as the baseline for the anticipated results in a field setting. 
In the implementation of this step, the answers to several questions, which 
encompass an early review of the seven MCES modules, may provide guidance for 
developing the experiment plan. Some example questions that should be considered 
during the INFOCON problem formulation phase are: 
• Who are the decision maker(s), and how are decisions made under normal 
conditions? 
• What mission area(s) are involved? 
• What are the basic assumptions of the problem? 
• What threat and scenarios are appropriate and available? 
• What level (system, subsystem, platform, force, etc.) is the analysis focused upon? 
• What type of measure(s) will answer the decision-maker's question? 
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1. Example INFOCON Field Experiment Objective 
One potential objective of an INFOCON field experiment is to investigate the 
effect of varying INFOCON levels, under operational conditions, on the war fighter's 
ability to conduct command and control functions. The goal of the experiment is to 
highlight how implementation of a defensive network posture will influence command 
and control decision-making and situational awareness in an operational environment. 
The effort should include investigations that illustrate inherent vulnerabilities associated 
with INFOCON's and discussion of experimental objectives aimed at researching the 
conceptual frame of potential solutions. 
2. Example INFOCON Experimental Questions 
One hypothesis for a field experiment is that the increasingly restrictive postures 
associated with progressive INFOCON levels will adversely impact the warfighters' 
ability to accomplish command and control functions. This implies that the key 
warfighting capability addressed in the experiment is the ability to accomplish mission 
tasking in the event of INFOCON implementations. Although specific field experiment 
capabilities are dependent on the dynamic operational environment, based on pending 
architectures and scenarios, example experimental questions can still be identified. 
Several questions are provided for reference. 
• What systems do each INFOCON setting impact? 
• What impact does INFOCON have on the warfighter's C2 capability? 
• What is the increase in time to complete a specific task? 
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• What work-around does the warfighter employ to complete mission assignments? 
• What     are     the     default     communication     methods     during     INFOCON 
implementations? 
D.       INFOCON SYSTEM BOUNDING AND PROCESS IDENTIFICATION 
It is critical that C3 system bounding and C3 process identification within the C3 
system of interest are accomplished early in the INFOCON field design. These are 
MCES Modules 2 and 3, respectively. The INFOCON operational experiment must be 
structured so that measurement (objective and subjective) of the impact of INFOCON 
constraints in the field setting can occur. The experiment should provide an opportunity 
to measure the systems affected by INFOCON's, the impact of INFOCON's on the ability 
of participants to maintain situational awareness and to conduct effective command and 
control, and to identify the work-arounds used by warfighters' to complete the mission, if 
possible, despite INFOCON implementations. C3 system bounding enumerates the 
relevant system elements that bound the problem of interest. When bounding the C3 
system of interest, one must identify the human, hardware and software entities, and 
structures that are related to the environment external to the C3 system being evaluated. 
After identifying the C3 system boundaries, the command and control processes (e.g. 
interactions between personnel, equipment, etc.) and their functions must be identified. 
The analyst should focus on the inputs and outputs to the processes under normal 
conditions so as to understand the adaptive processes that may be incorporated under 
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various INFOCON threat conditions.   The term processes in this context defines the 
interrelationships of tasks that are performed to fulfill the functions. 
As an example, the IA C2 INFOCON laboratory discussed in Chapter IV 
experiment focused on evaluating the impact of INFOCON on the Battle Watch Staff 
operating inside the Joint Operations Center (JOC) on a Flagship. The JOC is the focal 
point for decision-makers aboard a Flagship. However, the majority of the C4I 
functionality and operations for the Flagship are typically carried out in other operational 
spaces on ship. Hence, understanding the architecture, information flows, and how the 
system entities relate to the forces it controls and the environmental stimuli to which it 
responds (e.g. INFOCON implementations) is essential. 
1. Understanding the C4I Architecture, Information Flow and 
Integration Details 
During an INFOCON laboratory setting, the test bed C4I architecture is a 
compromise between credibility, complexity, and cost effectiveness. The results of the 
experiment must stand up to both technical scrutiny and even more importantly operator 
scrutiny. However, the test bed infrastructure, like the one designed for the 10 C2 
INFOCON laboratory experiment, does not permit the installation of a complete ship C41 
suite. Thus, planners are only able to replicate a representative cross section of the 
fielded computers and communication processes that are integrated on a command ship 
plus the connecting infrastructure. In contrast, an INFOCON field experiment would be 
populated with the complete suite of operational systems and driven by real world inputs 
that stimulate the environment.   A thorough understanding of the C4I architecture and 
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integration (MCES Module 4) issues related to the hardware and software entities to be 
evaluated during an INFOCON field experiment must be documented prior to the 
specification of measures. Here, the term architecture is used to describe the output of the 
integration module and should define interfaces and standards of the C3 system being 
evaluated. The final form of the architecture and information flow should include the 
process description of the system elements performing the processes that includes the 
interrelationships between equipment and humans. 
2.        Relationship Between Human Factors and Organizational Issues 
The analysis of C2 should consider all the relevant command levels and 
functions involved and should investigate issues of integration across 
command levels and functional domains over time. Consideration should 
also be given to the robustness and security of information systems and to 
human computer interface issues. Both human factors and organizational 
issues must be included in C2 analyses. (A Guide to Best Practice in C2 
Assessment, 1999) 
Since INFOCON C2 deals extensively with distributed teams of humans under 
stress and their decision-making behavior, the structuring of the problem and 
establishment of the research design cannot be completed without explicit consideration 
of both human factors and organizational issues. Although all elements of an INFOCON 
C2 system are ultimately related to one another, the linkage between human factors and 
organizational issues is particularly direct and close. Organizational design or command 
structure should reflect the interactions among the tasks to be completed, the humans 
available to perform them, and the equipment or tools that support those humans. Hence, 
in large measure the effectiveness of an organization's C2, in varying INFOCON levels, 
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will depend on the capabilities, training, and experience of the people in the C2 system. 
Since both human factors and organizational issues can impact C2 performance, 
efficiency, and effectiveness, analysts must consider their impact early in the experiment 
design process so measures aimed at obtaining a better understanding of human-in-the- 
loop issues associated with INFOCON implementations can be developed to better 
understand this human factors and organizational relationship. 
E.       INFOCON SCENARIO SPECIFICATION AND SELECTION ISSUES 
"The experiment scenario is a description of the area, environment, means, 
objectives and events related to a conflict or a crisis during a specified time frame suited 
for satisfactory study objectives and the problem analysis directives." (A Guide to Best 
Practice for C2 Assessment, 1999) This process of creating the scenario is an art that 
requires subject matter experts to identify, specify, and refine the scenario throughout the 
experimental design process. The first step is to identify the range of possible scenarios 
consistent with the problem structure and relevant human factors. The analysts goal is to 
identify those key or unique factors that must be included in the scenario so as to provide 
data collection opportunities that could help answer the analytical questions identified 
during the problem formulation phase. Next, some experienced analysts prefer to begin 
with an unbounded scenario set that defines the range of interests. Others have found that 
they can manage complexity better by specifying a particular set of scenarios of interest. 
In either case, multiple scenarios usually need to be considered to ensure that the problem 
is fully addressed. Finally, the analyst must review and refine the initial set of scenarios 
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to ensure that they cover the range of C2 issues and elements of the problem as well as 
any anticipated changes in the functional command and control process. 
The experiment scenario should incorporate specific events that impact both the 
INFOCON posture and the participant's ability to perform operational tasks. As an 
example, the IA C2 INFOCON laboratory experiment highlighted in Chapter IV 
consisted of a series of five nominal watches. Each successive watch was conducted at 
an increased INFOCON level and permitted participants to step through critical phases of 
a real world operational scenario, modified for the experiment, in a controlled snapshot 
fashion. The scenario for the IA C2 INFOCON laboratory experiment provided a 
framework within which to measure the impact of INFOCON implementations on a 
representative Battle Watch team. A similar approach for specifying and selecting 
scenario options for a field experiment should be explored. However, a unique aspect of 
the laboratory experiment, as opposed to a field experiment that must be considered is 
that operational networks supporting the experiment participants in the lab would be, in 
most cases, isolated from the external world. With this control, analysts can actually 
show the impact on the C2 systems of the various network attacks included in the 
scenario, a luxury that may not be available in an operational environment. The C2 
systems in the laboratory environment would also accurately reflect the current scenario 
INFOCON level. That is, data would not flow in the experiment if it would not be there 
at that particular INFOCON level, another level of control that may not be available when 
conducting an INFOCON experiment in a field environment. 
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F.        INFOCON MEASURES OF MERIT 
No single measure or methodology exists that satisfactorily assesses the overall 
quality of C2. "The crucial causal and analytic chain for C2 analyses is the linking of 
dimensional parameters to measures of system performance to measures of C2 
effectiveness and measures of force effectiveness." (A Guide to Best Practices for C2 
Assessment, 1999) Hence, analysts must specify the measures (MCES module 5) 
necessary to answer the problem of interest as defined in the problem formulation, system 
bounding process and integration phases. It is critical that the selection of Measures of 
Merit (MoM), like any other key step in the C2 methodology, be discussed with the 
decision-makers participating in the experiment. Their acceptance of this formulation is 
the beginning of their acceptance of the results of the experiment. 
A description of each Measure of Merit was extracted from the Guide to Best 
Practice for C2 Assessment, and is highlighted below along with a diagram presented as 
Figure 5-2 that illustrates the relationship between each different class of measures. In 
addition, several categories of INFOCON experiment measures are described below for 
reference. 
• Measures of Force Effectiveness (MoFE). which focuses on how a force performs 
its mission or the degree to which it meets its objectives. 
• Measures of C2 Effectiveness (MoE), which focuses on the impact of C2 systems 
within the operational context. Examples include the ability to formulate plans 
that work to achieve objectives, the capacity to create a common operating picture 
of the battlespace, and reaction time 
• Measures of C2 System Performance, which focuses on internal system structures, 
characteristics, and behavior.  Performance measures of a system's behavior may 
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be reduced to measure based on time, accuracy, capacity or a combination that 
may be interdependent. 
Dimensional Parameters (DP) are the properties or characteristics inherent in the 
physical C2 systems. Examples include bandwidth of communications linkages, 
signal to noise ratios, and luminosity of display screens in command centers. 
Environment 
Figure 5-2. Relationship Among Classes of Measures of Merit 
(A Guide to Best Practice for C2 Assessment, 1999) 
1. Impact of INFOCON on Mission Performance 
Analysts should develop a self-report measure that yields insight into the impact 
in a test subjects ability to perform tasks under varying INFOCON levels. This will 
provide perspective from each test subject. This assessment should further illustrate the 
mission activities impacted during an INFOCON implementation and highlight the 
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potential work-around necessary to complete required tasking under operational 
conditions. Information about the mission performance level of organizational members 
could be used to understand and assess intra-cell and inter-cell performance effectiveness 
across the spectrum of INFOCON levels. 
2.        INFOCON Workload Assessment with NASA Task Load Index 
If possible, subjective estimates of workload should be elicited from each 
participant using experiment specific NASA Task Load Index (TLX) questionnaires. 
NASA TLX is a subjective workload assessment tool that allows users to perform 
subjective workload self-assessment while working with various human-machine C3 
systems. As described earlier, TLX is a multi-dimensional rating procedure that derives 
an overall workload score based on weighted average of ratings on six sub-scales. These 
sub-scales include Mental Demands, Physical Demands, Temporal Demands, Own 
Performance, Effort, and Frustration. NASA TLX is a good tool to use during INFOCON 
experimentation efforts because it can be used to assess workload in various human- 
machine C3 environments and other process control environments. 
Appendix D, TLX Assessment Instruments, provides examples of the instruments 
used during the 10 C2 INFOCON laboratory experiment that was discussed in Chapter 
IV. The questionnaire in Appendix D elicits participant estimates of their own workload 
and of the workload experienced by other cells. In addition to yielding information about 
the perceived workload of individuals and cells in the organization, the measure can also 
be used to derive information about the balance or variability of workload across the 
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organization during an INFOCON implementation. This information is valuable because 
it can be used to distribute workload differently during each particular INFOCON. It can 
also be used to increase the participant's knowledge of dynamic organizational procedures 
and processes. 
3.        Relationship between INFOCON and Situational Awareness 
In general, situational awareness (SA) refers to the decision-makers moment-by- 
moment ability to monitor and understand the state of the complex system and its 
environment. Developing SA includes understanding many factors, including the 
commander's intent, mission, enemy intent, C4I architecture, information flow, etc. 
Generally speaking, the concept of SA refers to the mental process of knowing what is 
going on at any point and time in the surrounding environment. "SA is important in 
military decision-making for several reasons. It provides the foundation for subsequent 
decision-making and action selection in complex, dynamic environments." (Kemple and 
Hutchins, 1999) When emergencies arise, the completeness and accuracy of the decision- 
makers SA are critical to the ability to make decisions, revise plans, and manage the 
system. 
During an INFOCON, many factors can degrade an individual's SA, such as, 
information ambiguity, cognitive overload and human error, loss of communications or 
other information sources, and time delay in information receipt. Instruments should be 
developed to capture the effect of each factor on a participant's ability to complete 
mission tasking.    For many C2 experiments, including INFOCON, there may be no 
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existing measurement instrument available to clearly answer the question of interest. 
However, a methodology should be designed that will provide a measure of each 
participants ability to ascertain what occurred during a particular period of time in all 
specific areas of concern. It should be noted that developing a useful measurement 
instrument requires both creativity and an understanding of measurement theory. 
However, having an abundant supply of both these qualities does not necessarily 
guarantee success in truly understanding participants' situational awareness during a 
particular event. 
4. Instrumentation 
Instruments useful for performance measurement require a balance between 
experimental control on the one hand and operational realism on the other. "Experimental 
control refers to the ability to structure the environment so that the data obtained will be 
clearly interpretable. It means the environment presented to the participants needs to be 
controlled so that extraneous factors (intervening variables) do not cloud the picture by 
influencing performance in ways that are not intended while, at the same time, ensuring 
that the scenario is not so sterile that operational realism is missing." (Kemple and 
Hutchins, 2000) Experimental control includes the idea that the measurements need to be 
valid within the experimental setting while reliably capturing data that will provide 
answers to the question's of interest. Reliability refers to the idea that if the same events 
occur, the values should be relatively similar. Validity refers to the degree to which the 
measurement instrument actually measures what it was designed to measure. Validity 
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tests how well the measurement instrument fulfills its function. Operational realism 
requires that the measurement instruments not intrude upon the decision-makers process. 
G.  DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS STRATEGY 
Capturing experiment data and results is complex in concept, planning, and 
execution. However, if the experiment measures are correctly specified and correlated 
with the experimental question, then capturing the required data (MCES module 6) 
should result in answers to those questions. In planning, analysts have to become familiar 
with the dynamic conceptual terrain of the experiment. "As an added challenge, it is 
necessary that as concepts are developed and coupled to experimentation, that there exists 
some correspondence between the intent of the experiment, the concept being considered 
in planning the experiment, and data collected in the conduct of the experiment." 
(Schacher and Gallup, 2000) In general, this has meant that concepts have had to be re- 
defined as a set of questions, and that these derived questions must be related to those 
elements of data that would suffice to expand knowledge about the question and therefore 
the concept being considered. For this reason, it is important that data collectors 
understand the conceptual terrain of their respective observation areas and the related 
questions. 
Besides this concept-question-data instrument process, there are other very 
important data requirements. First, the questions defined during the problem formulation 
phase must be refined through the experiment. That is, based on the conduct and results 
of the experiment, a feedback mechanism should be implemented that identifies questions 
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that surface as a result during the experiment. These should be captured for further 
exploration. Second, innovation must not be neglected as a source of data. The data and 
analysis plan is the detailed plan that includes what data will be captured, by what capture 
means, at which experiment nodes, and what information will be produced from analysis. 
That said: 
The data capture plan is a proposal about what might be important, based 
on what has been defined as relevant questions, and may be observed in 
what is thought to be the probable set of activities in the experiment. It is 
certainly possible that there will be a completely different set of activities, 
or 'unexpected results', and these are often the most relevant and important 
results of an experiment. Data collectors must be sensitive to these 
occurrences, noting them with as much explanation as possible. (Schacher 
and Gallup, 2000) 
The INFOCON experiment observers should obtain qualitative and quantitative 
measures of activities as the test subjects engage various scenarios in a field setting. The 
observers working with the participants should do the primary data collection during an 
INFOCON field experiment. The observers should take notes to document observations 
concerning task performance in various levels of INFOCON, and the participants should 
have computer aided questionnaires to complete during the experiment that are aimed at 
quantifying subjective comments. Data should provide analysts with diagnostic 
information that may led to a better understanding of the impact of setting INFOCON on 
situational awareness and the command and control process. To carry out this effort, the 
analysts should develop a small set of diagnostic measures that are based on reliable 
instruments and procedures that have been used successfully in previous INFOCON 
laboratory experiments.   In addition, the C4I infrastructure should be instrumented (e.g. 
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server load monitoring, keystroke capture capability, etc.) to augment the observations 
with value added objective data. Understanding the intended data flow in the C4I 
architecture and the primary paths used to share information products should dictate 
where network instrumentation should be integrated. This equipment should be 
implemented to provide the statistical data set required when assessing information flow 
within the system under normal conditions as well as during various INFOCON 
implementations. 
Data aggregation is the final module (Module 7) in the MCES framework. For 
this effort, it addresses the issue of how the analyst will interpret the measures 
incorporated to better understand the implications of implementing INFOCON's on a 
command and control structure. 
The implementation of this module provides the analytical results tailored 
to address the problem posed at the beginning of the procedure. The 
results, made up of the aggregated values and measures should be 
provided to the decision maker in a format that will expedite his 
consideration of the analyses. (Sweet, 1986) 
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VI.      SUMMARY 
Information Operation Condition (INFOCON) implementations and specifically 
the impact these implementations can have on warfighting command and control 
processes are not yet widely understood or appreciated by the majority of the operating 
forces. INFOCON actions are designed to heighten or reduce defensive posture 
uniformly, to defend against computer network attacks, and to mitigate sustained damage 
to the DoD infrastructure. Experimentation is required to explore the effects on certain 
command and control processes under various INFOCON conditions. This thesis 
explored requirements for conducting these INFOCON experiments and resulted in the 
development of an INFOCON experimental design methodology that can be used as a 
framework for designing and conducting INFOCON experiments in the field. INFOCON 
experimentation efforts will provide insight and a better understanding of the effects that 
these implementations have on the ability of a commander to conduct seamless command 
and control functions after such conditions are instituted. 
The primary hypothesis associated with INFOCON implementation and 
articulated in this thesis is that the increasingly restrictive posture associated with 
progressive INFOCON levels will adversely impact the war-fighters' ability to accomplish 
command and control tasks in a network centric environment. Although the data set 
collected during the 10 C2 INFOCON laboratory experiment, discussed in Chapter IV, 
was relatively small, the results supported this hypothesis. However, experimentation 
aimed at researching INFOCON effects on command and control processes in an 
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operational setting is still required to better understand the real world effects of imposing 
such conditions. Hence, as mentioned above, this thesis focused on developing the 
framework to conduct an operational INFOCON experiment. That framework is 
discussed in Chapter V. The two primary research questions addressed in this thesis 
were: 
• How can the effects of INFOCON be evaluated in an operational environment? 
• What is an INFOCON experimental design framework for measuring the impact 
of INFOCON implementations on command and control in an operational setting? 
In order to thoroughly answer the research questions, this thesis was divided into 
six chapters including the Introduction and this Summary. Chapter II provided an 
overview of the Network Centric Warfare concept and discussed the requirements and 
challenges of maintaining information dominance in a Network Centric Warfare 
environment. It also gave the reader a broad overview of issues related to computer 
network vulnerabilities and discussed the challenges associated with protecting military 
networks from adversarial attack and highlighted actions that could be taken in such an 
event. 
Chapter III introduced the Information Operation Condition system and provided 
the reader with a complete description of the INFOCON defensive Information 
Operations (10) action. As discussed in chapter III, the INFOCON is a comprehensive 
defensive posture and response based on the status of information systems, military 
operations, and intelligence assessments of adversary capabilities and intent. In addition, 
this chapter highlighted the keys to successful INFOCON implementation. It emphasized 
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the importance of reviewing and testing INFOCON actions often to help personnel 
understand their roles and responsibilities, determining the effects of responsive measures 
as they relate to command and control decision making, and detecting problems in 
existing INFOCON procedures. 
As an initial step to better understanding the impact INFOCON implementations 
have on command and control functions in an operational setting, a controlled laboratory 
experiment, in which the author participated, was conducted at the SPA WAR Information 
Operations Center of the Future. The analysis of this initial INFOCON laboratory 
experiment was detailed in Chapter IV. The primary objective of this experiment was to 
investigate the relationship between military INFOCON implementations and their 
impact on the warfighter's ability to conduct operational command and control tasks. 
This laboratory experiment identified important information relating to situational 
awareness and command and control effectiveness that should be considered prior to 
imposing INFOCON in a real world field environment. 
Research and experiment planning for this effort provided information regarding 
how the effects of INFOCON can be evaluated in an operational environment, the first 
thesis question. Results from this experiment indicate that as the INFOCON level is 
increased, workload impact and time to complete functional tasks also increases, while 
battle space situational awareness decreases. Data collected during this laboratory 
experiment and discussed in Chapter IV indicate that the effects of INFOCON can be 
evaluated by measuring a participant's workload impact, situational awareness, and time 
delta to accomplish specific tasks under varying INFOCON situations.    Instruments 
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developed for this laboratory experiment are presented in Appendix D and could be used 
as a guide to measure the same command and control effects during a field experiment. 
Chapter V provides the INFOCON experimental framework for measuring the 
impact of INFOCON implementations on command and control functions in an 
operational environment, the second thesis question. The author chose to use the 
Modular Command and Control Evaluation System (MCES) as the basis for discussing 
an INFOCON experiment in a field setting because it provides a process to evaluate C3 
systems and architectures. The framework developed to conduct an INFOCON 
experiment in a field setting was centered on the MCES process. This process will help 
planners and analysts develop an experimental design that will ultimately capture the data 
required to support the analysis of the relevant experimental questions. The MCES 
presents a method to attack difficult concepts like INFOCON in a standardized manner 
and was used as a guide to develop the INFOCON experimental design methodology 
discussed in this section. 
In summary, the critical role of global networks to support military operations 
makes the development of effective infrastructure protection the utmost importance to 
naval forces. The INFOCON system provides DoD elements with a structured, 
standardized approach to defend against and react to attacks on computer systems and 
networks. Although much was learned about the effects of imposing INFOCON on an 
organizations command and control process from the initial INFOCON laboratory 
experiment, the test environment was artificial. Therefore, subsequent experimentation in 
an operational environment is needed to better understand the impacts that setting 
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INFOCON's will have on real world tasking. The methodology developed for this thesis 
should be used during planning efforts for just such an operational experiment. 
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APPENDIX A.     JCS INFOCON MEMORANDUM 
.^M?""^ 
Information Operation &"# i'^J m^ 
Condition 
CM-510-99 
10 March 99 
UNCLASSIFIED 
Subject: Information Operations Condition 
1. (U) This memorandum establishes the Information Operations Condition (INFOCON) 
for the Department of Defense. The system presents a structured, coordinated approach 
to react to and defend against adversarial attacks on DoD computers and 
telecommunications. Specific guidance and responsibilities for authorizing and 
communicating INFOCON's as part of information operations throughout the Department 
of Defense are provided at the enclosure. 
2. (U) INFOCON applies to the Joint Staff, Services, combatant commands, and Defense 
Agencies — as well as joint, combined, and other DoD activities throughout the entire 
conflict spectrum — peacetime through war. These procedures are effective immediately 
and will remain in effect until superseded by DOD instruction.   Addressees have 60 days 
from the date of this 
memorandum to develop procedures in compliance with the Enclosure, if required. 
3. (U) Joint Staff point of contact is Major Felipe Morales, J-3, (703) 693-4698 or DSN 
223-4698. 
Signed 
JOSEPH W.   RALSTON 
Acting Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
UNCLASSIFIED 
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APPENDIX C. COMTHIRDFLT INFOCON STANDARD OPERATING 
PROCEDURES 
Date Originated: 01 Nov 99 
Title: COMTHIRDFLT/USS CORONADO (AGF-11) INFOCON STANDARD OPERATING 
PROCEDURE 
Subject: INFOCON IMPLEMENTATION AND REPORTING PROCEDURES 
Reference: a. CINCPACFLT 220536Z AUG 98 (INFOCON SOP) 
b. CINCPACFLT 312056Z AUG 98 (Incident Reporting procedures) 
Purpose: This policy details the Commander Third Fleet's implementation and reporting procedures of 
Information Condition (INFOCON) levels. These INFOCON's typify threat Information Operations (10) 
activity at each INFOCON level and corresponding response measures to increase the defensive 10 
readiness of the entire AOR or a specific sub-region, depending on the 10 threat. This SOP provides 
guidance to all ships under Commander Third Fleet. 
Discussion: The decision to increase the INFOCON level is not a stand-alone process. Commander Third 
Fleet will establish INFOCON's within the AOR based on Network Incident Reports, Fleet Information 
Warfare Intrusion Incident Reports (IIR), Navy Computer Network Defense (CND) Network Incident 
Advisory messages, and JTF CND Network Incident Advisory or when directed by higher authorities. 
INFOCON's are NORMAL, ALPHA (Low Activity), BRAVO (Significant Activity), CHARLIE (Serious 
Activity), and DELTA (Critical Activity). These levels are analogous to THREATCON levels. Events that 
would raise or lower those levels may directly affect the existing INFOCON level. However, INFOCON's 
are independent from DEFCON and THREATCON levels. Commander Third Fleet could declare a higher 
INFOCON level without the declaration of a higher DEFCON or THREATCON level. 
INFOCON: Commander Third Fleet is the INFOCON declaration authority for all ships assigned under 
C3F. Establishing an INFOCON does NOT presuppose all response measures within the declared 
INFOCON will be activated. Upon declaration of INFOCON ALPHA or higher, C3F will direct specific 
defensive measures for implementation within the theater (e.g. Alpha measures 1-13, Bravo 1-35, Charlie 
measures 1-44, and Delta measures 1-47). Directed action may include measures from a higher INFOCON. 
For example, while in INFOCON ALPHA, C3F may direct additional measures listed for INFOCON 
BRAVO. 
a. INFOCON's and response measures apply to all GENSER and SCI Information Systems (i.e. NIPRNET, 
SIPRNET, Coalition Wide-Area Network (CWAN) and JWICS) within C3F AOR. 
b. The threat 10 activity described in each INFOCON, and the corresponding responses are not all 
inclusive. Each unit commander should review these measures for applicability and determine if additional 
response measures are required as well as promulgating amplifying instructions if necessary. Additionally, 
as technology changes, these measures should be reviewed periodically to account for vulnerability 
changes. 
INFOCON LEVELS: 
a. INFOCON NORMAL - This day to day condition warrants established routine security procedures. 
Typical threat 10 activity at this level includes random surveillance or reconnaissance probes on 
Commander Third Fleet's information infrastructure. Foreign press and public diplomacy activities are 
routine. At this level, daily information system security measures apply including automated 24 hour/day 
monitoring of critical command, control, and communication systems. FIWC provides 24 hour/day 
monitoring of CINCPACFLT and PRNOC Information Systems on NIPRNET and SIPRNET. 
b. INFOCON ALPHA (Low Activity) - This condition is declared when a general threat of information 
attack against Commander Third Fleet exists. Typical threat 10 activity at this level includes computer 
network scans, probes, or mapping, which might indicate an increased surveillance or reconnaissance 
against C3F's information infrastructure. Limited computer network attacks, with no operational impact, 
could also be expected at this INFOCON 
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level. Other forms of threat 10 activity could include public diplomacy efforts by an adversary to undermine 
U.S. regional interests and policy. Action addressees should be able to maintain response activity at this 
INFOCON for an indefinite period of time. 
c. INFOCON BRAVO (Significant Activity) - This condition is declared when a specific threat of an 
information attack against Commander Third Fleet exists. This condition may be prompted by information 
warfare (IW) threat warning assessment indicating specific adversary capabilities with evidence of intent. 
Typical threat 10 activity at this level includes limited computer network attacks with operational impact. 
Additional indicators include: increased anti-U.S./western rhetoric, leaflet campaigns, public 
demonstrations, public speakers, "Internet rumors," or media reports counter to U.S., U.S. allies, or U.S. 
coalition partners. Other indicators may include a significant increase in detected viruses, or limited denial 
of service attacks. Action addressees should be able to maintain response activity at this INFOCON for 
several weeks without undue personnel hardships or degrading Commander Third Fleet's ability to operate. 
d. INFOCON CHARLIE (Serious Activity) - This condition applies when an actual information attack 
occurs with significant operational impact. This condition could also apply when intelligence indicates the 
possibility of an imminent information attack against a Commander Third Fleet target with potential 
operational impact. Typical threat 10 activity at this level includes actual or threatened attempts to gain 
access to Commander Third Fleet computer network systems for the purpose of massive data destruction, 
false data creation, wide denial of service, or gaining control of critical systems. The injection across 
several networks of malicious code (i.e., viruses, worms, Trojan horses, etc.) and e-mail bombs all fall into 
this INFOCON. At this INFOCON level, entities acting either singularly, aligned, or in unprecedented 
coalitions, can be expected to counter U.S. policy through intense and broad regional press and public 
diplomacy. Response measures at this INFOCON are focused at protecting Commander Third Fleet's 
forces' ability to operate as needed. When implemented for even short periods of time, response measures at 
this INFOCON could create personnel hardship, affect peacetime activities, and have the potential for 
increased operational costs. 
e.    INFOCON DELTA (Critical Activity) - This condition applies when DEFCON 
and/or THREATCON levels exist to warrant extreme measures, or when the severity of an information 
attack against Commander Third Fleet significantly degrades readiness and operations. Extensive 
coordinated regional and global information attacks or slanders by entities with hostile intent toward/against 
the U.S. and its allies are expected, to include expose in the media, international forums, and over the 
Internet which are counter to U.S. policy and interests. Response measures at this INFOCON are focused on 
maintaining or restoring systems critical to Commander Third Fleet's ability to operate. As with INFOCON 
CHARLIE, action addressees will likely experience personnel hardships, increased operational costs (both 
time and dollars) and degradation in their peacetime activities. 
Action: 
ALPHA 1-13 
1. Call a meeting of the C3F Information Assurance (IA) Cell Working Group to inform them of the IO 
activity and immediate actions being taken. {IA Cell) 
2. Update points of contact list of phone numbers, e-mail addresses, and official message address list. (All 
Hands) 
3. Alert J6, Information System Security Managers (ISSMs) and Departmental Information System Security 
Officers (ISSOs) of increased threat condition. (ISSM) 
4. Issue threat assessments of suspected 10 activities and identify suspected friendly targets vulnerable to 10 
attacks. (ISSM, J6) 
5. Ensure all ISSMs, ISSOs, and System Administrators (SA) are briefed on the threat 10 activity and 
response measures. (ISSM) 
6. Increase OPSEC awareness. (IW Protect Officer) 
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7. Remind all users to be particularly suspicious of anyone requesting passwords for direct access to C4ISR 
systems. {All Hands) 
8. Remind all users that scanning computer disks for viruses is mandatory prior to use in PACFLT AOR 
computers. (All Hands) 
9. Remind all users to report unusual activity, viruses, and potential denials of service of computer or 
telephone systems including FAXs. Report unusual activity in accordance with established C3F Computer 
Network Incident reporting procedures. (See also CINCPACFLT message DTG 312056ZAUG98) 
(ISSM, ISSO, NSO) 
10. Validate the operation of server system log files, and in addition to daily reviews, review network 
monitoring logs, system audit logs, and server system log files for evidence of specific malicious activity. 
Specifics will be provided in the INFOCON implementation message, and based on the actual situation. 
(NSO) 
11. Contact CPF to ensure routers and firewalls protecting all segmented critical C4ISR systems have 
proper configuration settings to guard against known vulnerabilities and methods of recent attacks. (NSO) 
12. Remind all users that external unclassified E-mail access such as Hot Mail, Yahoo Mail, or "poping for 
mail" is prohibited on COMNAVSURFPAC computers. 
13. Remind all users that Internet Chat Rooms, Messengers, Stock or News Tickers are prohibited on 
C3F/USS CORONADO computers. (All Hands) 
BRAVO 1-35 
14. Ensure all telephone instruments are at least 3 feet from computers 
handling classified material. (ISSOs) 
15. Update and disseminate list of essential elements of friendly information (EEFI). (7 WProtect Officer) 
16. ISSMs, ISSOs and SAs will remind users of the need for passwords with 
a minimum of 8 random alphanumeric characters. This is to counter attempts to crack passwords with very 
large dictionary files. (ISSM, ISSO, NSO) 
17. Conduct periodic internal security reviews and external vulnerability assessments of C4ISR systems. 
(C3F ISSM, ISSO, NSO, SA) Reassess 8,10 and C3F's minimum computer security requirements are 
implemented 
18. Verify latest software patches/versions have been installed; coordinate with CPF, PRNOC, NAVCIRT 
and INFOSEC homepages. (ISSM, NSO/CPF N69) 
19. Identify critical computer files and review back-up procedures for those files. (NSO, SA) 
20. Confirm updated computer virus signatures are loaded and run virus detection/eradication software. 
(NSO, SA) 
21. At least once every 30 days, Network Security Officer will run available password cracker program, or 
an equivalent program, to detect and correct weak passwords. (NSO, SA) 
22. Direct all ISSMs, ISSOs, and SAs to increase their security awareness, particularly for critical C4ISR 
systems and place them on alert for possible recall after normal duty hours. (ISSM, ISSO, SA) 
23. Verify real-time audit capabilities, if available, are turned on. (NSO, 
SCISA)N/A 
24. Verified CPF has closed all remote maintenance ports on routers, firewalls, servers, and 
electronic phone switches. (ISSM) 
25. Review options and operational impacts of disconnecting all bridges between unclassified and classified 
networks, such as Secure Mail Guard (SMG) (this is the software portion) between unclassified and 
classified LANs. (IA Cell) 
26. IA Cell determines who are the NIPRNET operational users (i.e., CMOC, disbursing, medical and 
supply). Depending on the threat indicators, allow only operational users on NIPRNET, disconnect 
NIPRNET from the World Wide Web or secure NIPRNET completely. (IA Cell) 
27. Verify there are no unclassified dial-out capabilities from LAN workstations. (ISSO, SA) 
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28. Isolate compromised systems/local network from rest of wide area network. (ISSM, ISSO, NSO) 
29. As appropriate, implement alternate FAX numbers in response to denial of service attacks on FAXs. 
(Communications Officer) 
30. Conduct computer network vulnerability assessments to re-verify levels of information security. (ISSM, 
ISSO, NSO/CPF N69) Need checklist 
31. Verify port security posts guards on secondary power generation equipment for critical command and 
control centers within C3F AOR. (PhysicalSecurity Manager) 
32. When appropriate, direct all NSO and SAs to zero logins and force all accounts to enter new passwords. 
ISSMs, ISSOs, and SAs will remind users of the need of passwords with a minimum of 8 random 
alphanumeric characters. (ISSM, ISSO, SA, NSO) 
33. Verify compromised or unauthorized computer system accounts are frozen or eliminated. (NSO) 
34. Remove dial-in access to classified LANs not required for current operations. (C3F) N/A 
35. In the event of an actual computer network attack, users of the affected 
terminals, and the respective ISSM and ISSO, will isolate the affected terminal or network, ensure evidence 
is maintained to pass to law enforcement agencies, and then attempt to clean and recover the 
terminal/network. (ISSM, ISSO, NSO, SA) 
CHARLIE 1-44 
36. For the conduct of official business, use only classified mediums of information exchange where 
feasible, such as secure telephones (STU-IIIs), secure FAXs, and SIPRNET based systems such as Global 
Command and Control System (GCCS). (All Hands) 
37. Disconnect Secure Mail Guards (SMG) between unclassified and classified 
LANs. (J6) 
38. Review current IDS coverage and expand to additional computer networks, if operationally feasible. 
(NSO) N/A 
39. Physically disconnect the Secure Gateway Systems to isolate classified LANs. (J6) 
40. Review options, and impacts of, disconnecting all critical C4ISR systems capable of operating in a 
stand-alone mode. (IA Cell) 
41. Increase monitoring and audit review of Flag officer accounts. For those flag officer systems not in use, 
secure the hard drives. (NSO) 
42. Conduct maximum level of auditing. (NSO) 
43. Reroute mission critical communications through unaffected systems. (J6) N/A 
44. Disconnect non-mission critical C4ISR systems. (J6) 
DELTA 1-47 
45. Disconnect all critical C4ISR systems from the network that are capable of operating in a stand-alone 
mode. (J6) 
46. Remove all hard drives from systems not in use. (J6) 
47. Execute continuity of operations plans, and disseminate new contact information. (IA Celt) 
REPORTING: 
a. Commander Third Fleet will inform CINCPACFLT N69, FIWC (NAVCIRT) and NCTAMS PAC upon 
Commander Third Fleet's declaration of an INFOCON level. Primary reporting means will be via official 
message traffic. 
b. Subordinate commands will notify C3F within four hours of any change in INFOCON level. 
c. Classification. Definition of INFOCON levels, and response measures when linked to a specific 
INFOCON level or specific 10 threat, are classified Secret. 
Submitted by: Reviewed by:_ 
Approved by:  
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TLX Factoring: Part A 
First, before we start the experiment, think about the work you typically 
perform at your computer workstation duringnormal operational conditions 
at sea. Then, using the TLX Work Scale Definitions that you just read, 
think about which of the following aspects of your work are themost 
important contributors to your workload during a typical operational day. 
MENTAL DEMAND = MD 
PHYSICAL DEMAND = PD 
TEMPORAL DEMAND = TD 
EFFORT = EF 
PERFORMANCE = OP 
FRUSTRATION LEVEL = FR 
With that in mind, and using the two letter codes above, choose the one 
letter pair from each pairing below that is most important to your wokload 
(workload centrality). In other words, if the physical demand (PD) of your 
typical workload is more important each day than the mental demand (MD), 
circle the PD in the upper left pairing below. Continue to make your 
choices for all 15 pairings. 
PD / MD TD / PD TD / FR 
TD / MD OP / PD TD / EF 
OP / MD FR / PD OP / FR 
FR / MD EF / PD OP / EF 
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TLX Factoring: Part B 
Next, think about the work you typically perform at your computer workstation during 
normal operational conditions at sea. Then, using the TLI Work Scale Definitions that 
you read previously, think about which of the following aspects of your workload change 
the most during a typical operational day. 
MENTAL DEMAND = MD 
PHYSICAL DEMAND = PD 
TEMPORAL DEMAND = TD 
EFFORT = EF 
PERFORMANCE = OP 
FRUSTRATION LEVEL = FR 
With that in mind, and using the two letter codes above, choose the one letter pair from 
each pairing below that changes the most (workload variation). In other words, if the 
physical demand (PD) of your typical work varies more each day than the mental demand 
(MD), circle the PD in the upper left pairing below. Continue to make your choices for 
all 15 pairings. 
PD / MD TD / PD TD / FR 
TD /MD OP / PD TD / EF 
OP / MD FR / PD OP / FR 
FR / MD EF / PD OP / EF 
EF / MD TD / OP EF / FR 
Date/Time:   
Workstation: 
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Task Load Index Rating Scales 
Use the following six scales to evaluate [ l=(LOW) to 10 =(HIGH) ] the work you have 
been doing during the past few hours. Place a check mark (4) on each line below, and 
also write the corresponding whole number (1 through 10) to the right of each scale. 
MENTAL DEMAND 
I   1   I   I   I   I 
Low 
PHYSICAL DEMAND 
I   I   I   1   I   I 
Low 
TEMPORAL DEMAND 
1   I   I   I 
Low 
PERFORMANCE 
1   I   1   I   I   I   I 
Good 
EFFORT 
1   I   1   I   1   I   I   I 
Low 
FRUSTRATION 
I   I   I   I   I   I   I 
Low 
High 
I   1   I   1   I  
High 
1  i  I  i   1  i  I  i 
High 
1 ■  1  i  
Poor 
I   I  I 
High 
I   I  I I  1  I 
High 
Low / Poor = 1 High / Good = 10 
At this time, what is your most important task:  
Using a scale from 1 (poor) to 10 (excellent), what is your current task-related Situation 
Awareness level:  
At this time, what is your estimate of the amount of INCREASED time that it will take 






APPENDIX D. WORKLOAD INSTRUMENTS 
POST EXPERIMENT CONSIDERATIONS: I 
PLEASE PRINT 
The findings from this and two other experiments will be written up and put into a report 
that will be circulated to the project sponsors. Note: no names of individuals who 
participated in the experiments will be mentioned. However, it is appropriate to include 
some information that describes the people who provided the data. That is because any 
report will have different implications if the findings are based on college sophomores, as 
opposed to military officers, etc. 
The information obtained in the three IA C2 experiments this Year will be grouped or 
combined and reported as averages. We will comply with the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. 301), 
and no one's personal information will be disclosed. 
What is your (please print): 
Military Rank:  
Years of Military Service:  
Age:  
Gender:   
Military Designator/MOS/Rating (primary) Number: 
Military Designator/MOS/Rating (secondary) Number: 
Military Designator/MOS/Rating (tertiary) Number: _ 
Describe the formal IA training you have received, and when: 
What has been your best source of IA learning or training: 
What types of IA training do you, and others in your Designator/MOS/Rating require? 
Be specific:  
Continue to the next page. 
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POST EXPERIMENT CONSIDERATIONS: II 
PLEASE PRINT 
Given your typical at sea work position and operational tasking, in your opinion: 
1. At what level of INFOCON (Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, Delta) would you (or other 
military personnel who work in your position) first notice an impact on your ability to 
complete your work in a timely manner. 
2. At what level of INFOCON (Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, Delta) would you (or other 
military personnel who work in your position) notice a significant impact on your ability 
to complete your work in a timely manner. 
3. At what level of INFOCON (Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, Delta) would you (or other 
military personnel who work in your position) be unable to complete your work in a 
timely manner 
4. What computer software tools do you use most often to accomplish your work: 
5. What computer networked systems do you use most often to accomplish your work: 
6. What is the source for most of the information you need to accomplish typical mission 
related tasks at sea: 
7. Where do you send most of the information you process during a typical mission at 
sea:  
8. What other types of work at your command will most likely be impacted by 
INFOCON's, and then try to estimate the seriousness of those impacts: 
9. Include any comment below that you believe will be useful to the topics of 
INFOCON's or these IA experiments (continue on the back side if necessary). 
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